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Abstract 
Women’s land rights are increasingly advocated as an empowerment tool to spur development 
outcomes. However, empirical evidence of this relationship is limited. In this study we use data 
from peasant communities in rural Peru to explore the effect of the intra-household allocation of 
inherited land on women’s empowerment. Empowerment is modeled as a latent variable measured 
by different influence indicators using a Generalized Structural Equation approach. We draw on 
Item Response Theory (IRT) to estimate difficulty and discrimination parameters which can 
inform policymakers about the impact of empowerment policies on women’s types of influences 
within their households. The empirical approach is consistent with empowerment’s latent and 
multidimensional nature and pays attention to endogeneity issues often present in other empirical 
studies. We find that although women’s land rights increase empowerment, the intra-household 
allocation of land determines the magnitude of this impact.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Women in developing countries, compared to men, participate less in the labour market, 
earn lower wages, own less resources and exert less influence over household economic decisions 
(e.g., World Bank 2012).1 A growing body of literature has shown that women’s empowerment2, 
besides being an end in itself, can offset many of these disadvantages, and as a consequence, also 
generate a host of development outcomes (e.g., Smith and Haddad 1999; Schultz 2002; Sabroni, 
Quisumbing, and Ahmed 2013). As an example of the latter, the empowerment of mothers has 
been shown to increase the human capital of children (Duflo 2003), especially daughters, with 
salutary effects on future household income. The magnitude of the empowerment-effect on yields 
is estimated to be large enough to lead a fall in the number of food insecure people in the world 
by over 150 million (FAO 2011). Consequently, governments and non-profit organizations 
continue to expend considerable amounts of resources and time on women’s empowerment 
initiatives in developing countries (Harper et al. 2014; Gates 2014). 
Recent reviews of the literature, however, reveal that there exists remarkably little policy 
relevant information on the factors that drive women’s empowerment (Malhotra, Schuler, and 
Boender 2002; Allendorf 2007; Trommlerová, Klasen, and Leßmann 2015). Much of the 
voluminous literature on women’s empowerment in developing countries focuses on important 
conceptual definitions, with empirical components that rely largely on case studies and qualitative 
analysis (O’neil, Domingo, and Valters 2014). The relatively thin empirical literature on the 
                                                 
 
1
 In most low or middle income countries, females also have a higher mortality rate than men (World Bank 2012). 
Although, given the same care as males, females tend to have better survival rates than males at every age. (Sen 1990). 
2 Following the literature, empowerment throughout this study is measured by women’s influence  or “say” over 
household economic decisions (e.g., Basu 2006) 
2 
 
drivers of empowerment has been criticized for having failed to come up with an appropriate 
measure of the multi-dimensional nature of empowerment (e.g., Samman and Santos 2009). While 
empowerment is a multi-dimensional construct (e.g., Mason 1993; Kabeer 1999; Kishor 2000; 
Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka 2001), standard econometric modelling frameworks, such as 
regression analysis and limited dependent variable models, accommodate only unidimensional 
outcomes. This inconsistency has forced empirical empowerment studies to limit their outcome 
measures to a single dimension of empowerment (e.g., influence or decision-making authority over 
asset sales), or use an aggregated empowerment score, like the Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI) developed to track the impacts of the US Government’s Feed the Future 
Initiative (Alkire et al. 2013), that is based on an arbitrary set of weights. Quantitative analyses of 
the drivers of empowerment have also been criticized by Trommlerová, Klasen, and Leßmann 
(2015), Samman and Santos (2009) and others, on methodological grounds, such as the 
inconsistent use of linear estimators in nonlinear specifications and for not addressing the 
endogeneity of key determinants. 3 
The gap in the literature is particularly noticeable in the wake of recent development 
policies which stress land rights as an instrument for empowering women and spurring 
development in poor economies. In fact, the recent UN Sustainable Development Goals refer to 
women’s land rights under Goal 1 (No poverty), Goal 2 (Zero hunger) and Goal 5 (Gender 
equality) (UN 2015). It is often claimed that women constitute, on average, 43% of the agricultural 
force in developing countries and produce between 60% to 80% of the food (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa 1972; Momsen 1991; Gupta 2009). However, the distribution 
                                                 
 
3
 e.g., Garikipati 2008; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Hindin 2000; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; Jejeebhoy 2000; Roy 
and Niranjan 2004; Gupta and Yesudian 2006; Allendorf 2007; Allendorf 2012; Lokshin and Ravallion 2005. 
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of land remains highly biased against women. Based on the limited available data, it is estimated 
that less than a quarter of landholders in developing countries are women.4 Women also remain 
dependent on men for gaining access to land, regardless of their own rights (Deere and Leon 2003; 
Rao 2005). In  places such as rural Peru, communal ownership of land, governed by customary 
laws, norms and practices regarding inheritance and ownership, dictate women’s de facto and de 
jure rights5 (Budlender and Alma 2011). In such economies, women farmers are believed to have 
less control than men over services such as credit, inputs and livestock transfers and sales due to 
fragile or non-existent land rights (FAO 2011). 
However, while the effect of women’s empowerment in spurring growth and development 
is the subject of a fast growing body of research (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Duflo 2003), the 
effect of women’s land rights on women’s empowerment is a “rarely studied” issue in empirical 
development economics (Allendorf 2007, p.11). The effect of land rights on women’s 
empowerment is complex, and likely to depend on the social context including how property rights 
are managed and enforced in the community, as well as on the land rights of other members of the 
woman’s household, specifically her spouse. 
1.1 Overall Goal and Thesis Objectives 
The overall goal of this thesis is, therefore, to fill the gap in the literature by a) developing 
a new econometric framework for studying the determinants of women’s empowerment and b) 
using the framework to study the effect of women’s land rights on their empowerment. In contrast 
to the rest of the literature, our approach treats women’s empowerment as a continuous latent 
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 Authors’ calculation from the (FAO 2010) 
5 While rural Andean communities have their own tenure systems and rules, women’s rights in practice can deviate 
from this rules 
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variable that is unobserved; we observe, instead, a set of influence indicators that represent a 
woman’s authority over a range of different household economic decisions. Therefore, unlike 
previous studies, our approach allows us to model the multidimensional nature of empowerment 
(measured by the influence indicators) and simultaneously estimate the effect of a covariate on 
latent empowerment. It also allows us to calculate the effect of a change in latent empowerment 
on each influence indicator. 
To meet our overall goal, we have two specific objectives. First, using a set of primary data 
that we collected from rural Peru in 2014, we examine how land rights and their intra-family 
distribution affect women’s empowerment. We compare the magnitude of the effect of land rights 
held by women and male members of their households with the effect of other more commonly 
recognized determinants of empowerment, such as education. Due to endogeneity issues of using 
ownership of land and the nature of our study area, we define land rights as inheritance of usufruct 
rights.  
Second, we examine how empowerment, conditional on land rights and other determinants, 
is linked to women’s influence over different household economic decisions (e.g., control over 
credit or distribution of income from livestock). In this context, for each influence category, we 
estimate a “threshold” and a “sensitivity” parameter. These two parameters summarize how a 
policy change that alters women’s empowerment may be expected to alter different types of 
women’s influence, each of which may be uniquely associated with a specific development 
outcome. For instance, it is plausible that while land rights have a positive effect on women’s 
empowerment, they may have different effects on different types of empowerment as measured by 
the influence indicators. An increase in empowerment may increase women’s influence over credit 
decisions (which is helpful in leveraging better investment outcomes) or alternatively 
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empowerment may increase women’s influence over agricultural and livestock decisions (which 
is helpful for achieving land use change objectives of policymakers rather than investment 
outcomes). The threshold and sensitivity of an influence indicate how much empowerment is 
required to turn on a particular influence and, conditional on the threshold point, the sensitivity of 
the influence to a change in empowerment. Ideally, policymakers would prefer to target women’s 
influences with lower thresholds and a higher sensitivity to achieve development outcomes. 
Our econometric approach for meeting our two specific objectives is based on item 
response theory (IRT) which we operationalize using a generalized structural equation model 
(GSEM) (Skrondal and Rabe-hesketh 2007). Both GSEM and IRT have been applied widely in 
the psychometrics literature (Rasch 1960; Thurstone 1927; Lawley 1943) and is now is the subject 
of a small but growing literature in in economics led by scholars’ recognition of its immense 
potential in the applied economic world (most notably see Das and Zajonc 2010). IRT has been 
applied widely in the psychometrics literature (Rasch 1960; Thurstone 1927; Lawley 1943) but its 
use has been limited in economics despite scholars’ recognition of its potential in the applied 
economic world (Skrondal and Rabe-hesketh 2007). Since our observable influence indicators are 
a set of discrete ordered variables which we link to a latent construct of empowerment and 
subsequently to a set of covariates including land rights, the appropriate framework is Graded 
Response Model, a type of IRT that is appropriate for categorical items (Samejima 1997).  
Specifically, our econometric model has two components. The first “structural” component 
of our model allows us to estimate how changes in land rights and other determinants affect 
women’s empowerment. The estimates from this component help address objective 1 by 
identifying if land rights are an effective policy lever that can be pulled to catalyze women’s 
empowerment as a development tool. The second “measurement” component relates the multiple 
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influence indicators to their underlying level of empowerment. The measurement component of 
our model allows us to estimate how a change in empowerment shifts different types of influence 
a woman has over household economic decisions. Thus, the estimates from this part of the model 
allow us to address objective 2 and identify the types of women’s influence that can be leveraged 
by empowering women through land rights and other determinants. 
We empirically test the role of land rights in empowering women using data from six 
different highland peasant communities in Peru. We construct a set of discrete ordered indicators 
of the level of a woman’s influence over the household economic decisions (e.g., influence over 
credit application and spending or influence over how to spend income from livestock production). 
Our approach contrasts with the bulk of the empirical literature on women’s intra-household 
decision-making power which typically employs an indicator summarizing women’s decisions 
about one single dimension of empowerment that is easily observable, such as food consumption 
(Patel et al. 2007), or an aggregated index of empowerment (e.g., Parveen and Leonhäuser 2004). 
1.2 Contributions to the Literature 
Our study makes several novel contributions to the women’s empowerment literature. First, 
we contribute to the literature on the issue of land rights and women’s empowerment. Despite the 
intense policy attention in recent years given to the issue of using land rights as a means for 
empowering women in developing countries, there are hardly any studies that validate this claim 
empirically (Allendorf 2007). Allendorf’s (2007) study of this issue in Nepal is a notable 
exception. However, unlike Allendorf, we use separate information on land inheritance of men, 
women or both. By using inheritance data for land rights, rather than direct information on land 
holdings, we avoid methodological problems related to endogeneity of the land rights variables 
that have plagued other studies such as Allendorf’s (2007). Our study also explores the intra-family 
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allocation of land rights and their impact on women’s empowerment. Although the importance of 
intra-family allocation of access to resources is well recognized (Von Braun and Webb 1989; Due 
and Gladwin 1991; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997), it is rarely explored in the literature 
on land rights and women’s empowerment due to data limitations (see Allendorf 2007). As far as 
we know, Wiig's (2011) study of land rights on women’s empowerment in Peru is the only study 
that tests the effects of the intra-family allocation of land. However, Wiig’s study measures 
empowerment using a public goods game making it hard to generalize the findings and impossible 
to draw conclusions about the effect of land rights on different dimensions of empowerment. 
Second, we apply an econometric approach that is new to the analysis of women’s 
empowerment and that allows us to overcome the problems faced by previous studies on this issue. 
As far as we know, only one study by Pitt et al. (2006) in the women’s empowerment literature 
has used a multidimensional model of empowerment which, differently from our approach, is 
based on factor analysis. While we estimate the measurement and structural components of our 
model simultaneously using maximum likelihood, Pitt et al. (2006) use a two stage approach which 
is less efficient and with unknown coefficient estimator properties.  
Third, a strong assumption in most empirical work using ordered choice models is that that 
the items elicited through a series of survey questions are received in a similar manner by 
respondents. Our primary analysis uses data on responses given by women on their influence over 
household decision making. In our context, we are particularly concerned if the answers by women 
to women’s decision-making power questions would be different if the same questions were posed 
to men. This distortion can occur for instance if the questions have a subjective component and 
are open to interpretation differently by men and women (see Mohapatra and Simon, (forthcoming) 
for a detailed example). This phenomenon occurs when survey questions (viz., our influence 
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indicators) that measure a latent trait (empowerment) are received differently by different groups 
of people with the same value of the latent trait and is called differential item functioning (DIF). 
Although DIF arises naturally in ordered choice models it is usually ignored in economic studies 
due to methodological limitations of ordered logit and probit models (Greene and Hensher 2009). 
In our context, however, it is necessary to check for DIF since it can directly affect the assessment 
of the impact of land rights on women’s empowerment. We address the DIF problem across men 
and women by estimating a larger IRT model that we use in our analysis with responses on 
women’s influence collected from both men and women respondents. We introduce a gender (sex) 
variable into the measurement part of our model to look for evidence on DIF and evaluate if our 
results regarding our main hypothesis about land rights and women’s empowerment still holds 
after accounting for the bias due to DIF. 
Fourth, our study is also a timely analysis of peasant communities in rural Peru. Recent 
years have seen a growing concern among policymakers and activists about the stark gender 
inequalities that mark Peru’s rural economic landscape. Gender gaps are most pronounced in rural 
communities where relative to boys, girls have less access to almost all kinds of productive 
resource including education, work opportunities, and nutrition (PNUD 2010; Kabeer 2011). The 
policy response has been focused primarily on increasing women’s land rights to reduce these 
gaps. The most notable of these responses was a massive national program launched in the early 
1990s, the Special Land Titling Program (PETT), which focused on distributing land titles to 
women during its second phase. Since the peasant communities manage their resources 
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collectively and have their own jurisdiction, however, such land reforms permeate into these 
communities in complex ways, and often meet with limited success6. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Section 2 provides a background of women’s land rights, as well as a literature review of 
the empirical studies of land rights and women’s empowerment. The arguments for using land 
rights to induce empowerment are also discussed in this section. Section 3 describes the geographic 
characteristics, communal land tenure systems, and livelihoods of our study area. Our sampling 
methodology and data collection are described in Section 4. This includes a detailed description 
of the WEAI tool and how it was implemented in our study. Section 5 provides a literature review 
of the common methodological and measurement problems of the empirical studies of women’s 
empowerment. Our variables and empirical model are described in Section 6. In particular, we 
introduce Item Response Theory, describe the structural and measurement components of our 
Generalized Structural Equation Model (GSEM) and explain how empowerment thresholds and 
sensitivities are estimated.  The results of our structural component, as well as the empowerment 
thresholds and sensitivities, are reported in Section 7. The results of our alternative models are also 
reported in this section. In Section 8 we discuss our results and provide some policy implications 
of our study. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss our study’s limitations and draw conclusions from 
the results of our study. 
                                                 
 
6 The PETT program was not implemented in formally recognized peasant communities where land is defined as 
communal property (Wiig 2013) 
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Section 2: Land Rights and Women’s Empowerment 
The objective of this section is to situate our study in the existing literature of women’s 
land rights and empowerment. To do so, we first discuss land rights and how we define them in 
our study. We then review the empirical work that has analyzed this topic and highlight the 
methodological and econometric issues in the literature. Lastly, in the second part of this section 
we review the arguments that support the linkage between land rights and empowerment. 
2.1 Definition of Land Rights  
Land rights include a variety of legitimate claims to land and its benefits (Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Most policy attention and researchers focus on effective 
land rights or claims that are legally or socially recognized and enforced by a village-level or state-
level institution (Agarwal 1994). Although ideally studies should consider different aspects of land 
rights, such as tenure security or control over land, most empirical studies define land rights as 
ownership of land due to data limitations (e.g., Allendorf 2007). In our study area it is more 
relevant to focus on usufruct rights since the peasant communities are the legal land-owning 
entities. Although traditionally there were no land markets, usufruct rights have been passed down 
the generations through inheritance. Thus, while land rights in the studies reviewed in this section 
are defined more broadly, we define land rights as the inheritance of usufruct rights to land.    
2.2  Review of Empirical Studies   
Some studies have examined the direct linkage between women’s land rights and welfare 
outcomes. For example,  Panda and Agarwal (2005) found that women in Kerala, India who own 
land are less likely to suffer from physical and psychological domestic violence. In a study in 
Honduras and Nicaragua, Katz and Chammorro (2003) also found a positive effect of land rights 
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on households’ food expenditures and child education attainment. These studies often implicitly 
assume that significant coefficients of women’s land ownership variables in income or other 
welfare outcomes are linked to the bargaining power of women, rather than testing for this linkage 
explicitly. For instance, Deere et al. (2004) found that women’s land rights have a positive effect 
on off-farm income of dual-headed households in Peru. The authors attribute this effect to land 
right’s positive impact on women’s intra-household bargaining power. The impact of land rights 
on off-farm income, however, can also be attributed to other factors, such as relaxed credit 
constraints of the household that allow women to diversify their livelihoods. 
On the other hand, studies that use women’s empowerment (rather than a household 
welfare measure) as an outcome variable often include ownership of land in aggregated asset 
measures as a covariate. For instance, Deere and Twyman (2012) find that women’s share of 
wealth increases the likelihood of symmetric joint decision-making regarding their decision to 
work and spending income in Ecuador. Similarly, Jejeebhoy's (2000) study of women’s 
empowerment in India uses an index of control over economic resources which includes ownership 
and control over land and other valuables. This approach, however, makes it impossible to identify 
the individual impact of land rights. 
In the absence of solid empirical evidence on the issue, some scholars are of the opinion 
that land ownership may not necessarily empower women (Kathewera-Banda et al. 2011). 
According to this view, claiming land rights as a determinant of women’s empowerment without 
empirical evidence disregards the contribution of other factors, such as skills, age, and access to 
credit, that could have a greater impact on empowerment and thus be more efficient gender policy 
tools. Moreover, women’s land rights may not be empowering if access and control are mediated 
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by men, if land tenure is insecure or if land is infertile (Kathewera-Banda et al. 2011; ActionAid 
2013). 
Although land rights continue to be pushed as a policy to empower women7, few studies 
have attempted to provide evidence of the linkage between land rights and empowerment and 
challenge the views described above. A problem faced by researchers attempting to causally link 
land rights and women’s empowerment is endogeneity. Often, due to data limitations studies use 
ownership of land as a proxy for land rights (e.g. Allendorf 2007). Using land ownership as a proxy 
for land rights is clearly problematic because empowered women are more likely to be able to 
purchase land since they may also have a higher income earning ability. 
Ideally, natural experiments would allow researchers to properly identify the causal link 
between land rights and women’s empowerment. However, it is difficult to track land reforms that 
have exogenously or randomly assigned land rights to women. Wiig’s (2013) community level 
empirical analysis of the PETT program in Peru, to our knowledge, is the only study which uses a 
natural experimental approach. The study uses land titles before and after the PETT program as a 
proxy for land rights8. The distribution of land titles is argued to be uncorrelated with community 
characteristics, making the land rights variable exogenous. The analysis includes two community-
level variables representing the proportion of plots inherited by men and women. The results show 
that men’s inheritance has a negative impact on women’s empowerment. The study also finds that 
joint titles increase women’s decision-making, especially for decisions regarding agriculture and 
                                                 
 
7 In fact, the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5.a states: “Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to 
economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial 
services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws.” (UN 2015)  
8 Other studies have also used similar approaches to study the impact of joint land titling programs on outcomes such 
as soil conversation and land inheritance by gender (Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2014), women’s labor supply (Field 
2011), and labor allocation (Nakasone 2011).  
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land-related investment. Although this study does not suffer from endogeneity issues in the sense 
described above, its analysis of land inheritance is at the community level only. Thus, the impact 
of land inherited to men could be an indirect measure of the overall gender bias in each community, 
which could impact whether women’s opinions are taken into account at the household level. 
Where natural experiments are not available, field experiments (e.g., public good games) have also 
been used to estimate empowerment and test the effects of land rights (e.g., Wiig 2011). However, 
these experiments are difficult to recreate and their conclusions cannot be easily generalized. 
In the absence of experimental data some scholars argue that information on the amount of 
land inherited by the woman is an alternative proxy for women’s land rights (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 2003; Wiig, Bråten, and Fuentes 2011). The assumption is that acquisition of inherited 
assets does not depend on the bargaining power within the household and is exogenous to 
empowerment. However, since inheritance data are usually not available, most studies that analyze 
the direct impact of land rights on women’s empowerment have used ownership of land as a proxy 
for women’s land rights. The first is a study of five Asian countries by Mason (1998). The study 
ran OLS regressions where the dependent variable was a six item scale indicator measuring 
women’s influence in household decisions. Mason’s findings suggest that ownership of land 
increased domestic decision-making for women in India and Thailand. The second study is an 
empowerment study using the 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) by Allendorf 
(2007). Two metrics of empowerment were used in this study: an ordinal variable measuring the 
number of decisions the woman participated in and a binary variable showing if the woman 
participated in most decisions or not. These indicators were analyzed in ordered probit and logit 
models respectively. Allendorf found a positive effect of ownership of land on women’s influence 
over household decision-making that is comparable to the effect of other determinants such as 
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education. Although these studies suggest that increasing land rights is indeed a promising route 
to promote women’s empowerment, they do not address the endogeneity issues of using ownership 
of land as a proxy for women’s land rights. 
2.3 Arguments for Women’s Land Rights and Empowerment 
Despite the limited empirical evidence, there are clear arguments for using women’s land 
rights as a tool for empowering women. Several scholars argue that land ownership increases 
women’s security and influence, thereby helping them to take control over household decisions 
(Agarwal 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). Manser and Brown (1980)explain this 
relationship using a bargaining model of intra-household resource allocation where marriage is 
treated as a cooperative game. In their model a woman’s ownership of land, relative to her spouse, 
would improve her threat point and change the resulting Nash equilibrium in her favor. Thus, a 
woman with more capital, or in this case land, will have a higher threat point since her fallback 
position in case of a divorce will be stronger (Manser and Brown 1980). 
 In some situations, a divorce might not be a plausible threat because of the economic or 
social costs related to dissolving a marriage. In Lundberg and Pollak (1993) bargaining model each 
individual controls their own income and contributes to a collective good to maximize their own 
utility taking their partner's contribution as given. The result is a non-cooperative and inefficient 
equilibrium, or threat point, where the couple might still be better off than if they were divorced. 
The threat point is determined by each partner’s contribution and, therefore, their income. In this 
context, as long as women control the land rents of their property, land rights can increase their 
income contribution influencing the equilibrium. This relationship has also been described as the 
norm of “perceived contribution response” (Sen 1990), where the man will be expected to decide 
more within the household if his income contribution is greater. 
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According to Agarwal (1994), women’s threat point is not only determined by their 
ownership of assets and income contribution to the household. Agarwal (1994) argues that access 
to external support systems from outside the household, NGOs, or the state increase women’s 
ability to survive outside the household increasing their bargaining power. Furthermore, Agarwal 
argues that due to social or cultural forces women might not have a “voice” in some aspects of life 
for which bargaining might not happen at all. Thus, contextual factors from outside the 
household—specifically social and traditions that shape land rights—can also be important 
mediators of the impact of women’s land rights on empowerment. 
A shortfall of the bargaining models is that they only predict the impact of land rights for 
women in dual-headed households. However, we can expect the same processes that increase 
women’s bargaining power within their household to impact women’s agency as they interact with 
other members in their households and in their communities. In fact, ethnographic evidence 
supports these claims. Agarwal (1994), for example, found that widows in Rajasthan, India 
received more respect and consideration in their communities when they owned land. Similarly, 
we can expect a single woman’s situation within a community to improve if she owns land or other 
real-estate.  
  The various bargaining models underscore the importance of women’s land rights in 
determining their power. It is important to note, however, that according to these models it is the 
land rights held by a woman, relative to male members in her household, which matters to her 
empowerment. However, the intra-family distribution of land rights and their impacts on women’s 
empowerment have been neglected in the empirical literature reviewed above. To our knowledge, 
Allendorf (2007) is the only author that has tried to include the intra-household allocation of land 
rights in an empowerment model. Allendorf (2007) addressed the lack of data on intra-household 
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land allocation by assuming that landless women who work in any relative’s land belong to the 
category of “lives in landed household” where land rights are held by other members within the 
woman’s household. The other two categories in this study are “owns land herself” and “lives in 
landless household”. The results suggest that women who own land themselves are more likely to 
be empowered than those women living in landed households. Even though this approach does not 
account for the effect of land rights held by husbands or other male members within the “lives in 
landed household” category, these results suggests that the intra-household allocation of land also 
plays a role in women’s empowerment. 
Thus, despite the focus on land rights as a policy tool to spur empowerment, the direct 
linkage between land rights and empowerment has rarely been tested empirically. The few 
exceptions have methodological issues and, hence, empirical evidence is still needed to support 
the rationale for land rights as a development tool. Our study addresses this gap by directly testing 
the effect of land rights on women’s empowerment using land inheritance, an exogenous measure 
of land rights. 
Section 3: Study Area 
The objective of this section is to discuss how the area’s climatic conditions and history of 
conflicts over land have shaped farmers’ livelihoods in our study area. This section is organized 
in three parts. First, we provide background information of our study area’s climatic and 
geographic characteristics. We then summarize the history of conflicts over land of peasant 
communities in rural Peru and the tenure rules in these communities. The third sub-section 
discusses the livelihood activities of farmers in our study area.   
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3.1 Climatic and Geographic Characteristics 
Our study is based in the Upper Mantaro Watershed in the Peruvian High Andes. The 
Mantaro Watershed, located in the center of Peru, generates 35 percent of the country’s electricity 
and provides food products for Peru’s capital city Lima. With a population of 700,000 and its 
important agricultural activities, the Mantaro Watershed represents an important area for Peru’s 
economy (CONAM 2005). Our data was collected from six different peasant communities located 
in this area. The Mantaro Valley has been divided into an upper, middle and lower regions based 
on their different climatic and biodiversity characteristics. The Upper Mantaro Watershed, 
typically made up of the Andean highlands, extends from Lake Junín to Ingahuasi and is located 
between 4100 and 3000 meters above sea level. The climate in the Upper Mantaro Watershed is 
characterized by a cold dry season from April to September with nightly temperatures ranging 
from 5 to 0⁰C and daily temperatures ranging from 0 to 5⁰C. The rainy season extends from 
October to March with daily temperatures that range between 10 and 20⁰C. Given its altitude and 
extreme climatic conditions, this area is highly vulnerable to meteorological and geodynamic 
phenomena, such as droughts, frosts, torrential rains and landslides, which could be exacerbated 
by climate change (CONAM 2005).  
Our study takes place in 6 different peasant communities around Lake Junín in the Upper 
Mantaro Watershed belonging to the provinces of Junín and Pasco. Figure 1 shows the study area 
and communities involved.  Lake Junín is the second largest lake in Peru and it has been a protected 
area since 1974. It was also recognized as a Ramsar Wetland of Global Significance in 1997 
(Ramsar Sites Information Service 1997) and as a Globally Important Bird Area in 2008 (Angulo 
Patrolongo 2009). Despite its recognition as an area of globally-important biodiversity, nearby 
mining operations and sewage from surrounding cities have polluted the lake threatening its 
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biodiversity. Since many peasants’ communal lands fall within the buffer area of the lake, pollution 
and water levels also impact peasants whose livelihoods depend on these lands. 
The area around the lake is characterized by the life zone páramo where grasslands and 
bofedales, carbon-rich Andean peatlands, domain the landscape. Although there are limited data 
on the carbon content of the soils in this area, a study suggests that the dry Peruvian Andes might 
represent 0.1% of the total carbon stored in soils in the world (CIP 2010). There is also evidence 
that croplands, especially potato cultivation, in the area are expanding due to rising temperatures 
(De Haan and Juárez 2010). The rate of conversion of natural rangelands has increased drastically 
with the recent boom of maca. Given the potential contribution of these land use dynamics to 
carbon emissions, the Government of Peru is interested in implementing a carbon storing 
environmental services program in this area (CIP 2010). 
3.2 Peasant Communities in Rural Peru: A History of Conflicts Over Land 
The majority of the agricultural production in Peru is controlled by comunidades 
campesinas or peasant communities. The communities are institutions with members that organize 
and manage their lands and assets following traditions and customs. Peasant communities have a 
long history of struggle over resources, especially land. In the twentieth century, hacendados9 
invaded communal lands forcing the communities to move to lower quality lands. After 
constitutional changes in 1933, the communities were able to be legally recognized as indigenous 
communities which provided them with social protection and the means to reclaim their land from 
the hacendados (Roberts and Samaniego 1978).  
                                                 
 
9 Landowners of haciendas, a large estate where tenants worked for a landlord in exchange of plots of land for 
themselves.  
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In the 1970’s, land reforms created rural-cooperatives called Sociedades Agrícolas de 
Interés Social (SAIS), to control the lands expropriated from the haciendas.10 Many communities 
opposed the SAIS because they wanted to manage and control the land themselves. All over Peru, 
peasant communities fought for their independence from the SAIS demanding to receive their 
lands back (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries 2006). To this day, conflicts over land between the SAIS 
and some communities are still on-going. In Junín, the conflict between the SAIS Tupac Amaru 
and the community of Ondores over more than 20,000 hectares has lasted for several years (Nuijten 
and Lorenzo 2009). The constant, and often violent, fights over land have made community 
members very protective of their land. 
 In the 1980s Peru suffered under the terrorist regime of the Maoist movement sendero 
luminoso or Shining Path. Many peasant communities supported the ideals of the Shining Path as 
they wanted to eliminate the SAIS and return the land to the communities. However, the violent 
means of the group, which included the public assassination of political and community leaders, 
public trials, and attacks to the SAIS, instigated a strong fear among the people that is still present 
today in some rural communities of the Peruvian Andes (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries 2006).  
Finally, the new Constitution of 1993 and a new Land Law in 1995 allowed for the 
privatization of communal land creating large changes for the peasant communities. Large scale 
titling programs following these laws, including a national land titling program known as the 
Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural (PETT) or Special Land Titling and 
Cadastre Project, have allowed community members to get titles for lands that are technically 
                                                 
 
10 Comunidades campesinas (peasant communities) became the official name for the indigenous communities after 
the land reform of 1970 (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries 2006) 
20 
 
owned by the community (Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries, 2006).11   Thus, although these changes 
increased farmers’ tenure security, they also created conflicts and division within peasant 
communities. 
3.2.1 Communal Land Tenure Systems 
Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries (2006) provide a detailed description of property relations in 
one indigenous Andean community called Usibamba in the Department of Junín. The following is 
a summary of the general trends in peasant communities and their communal land tenure systems 
as described by Nuijten, Lorenzo, and Vries and as informed by our fieldwork. 
Land allocation decisions, as well as most other decisions affecting the community, are 
made by the community’s executive leaders who are elected every year. The highest authority, 
however, is the general assembly made up of all community members. Most decisions have to be 
presented and accepted by the general assembly before being enforced. In peasant communities 
land is allocated only to community members. Membership is usually granted to children of 
existing members only since most communities are wary of outside people. Members are expected 
to fulfill certain duties, such as attending community meetings and participating in communal work 
parties, in exchange for receiving communal land and other benefits of the community. They can 
also be asked to participate in community committees as leaders or members. Community 
members do not receive any sort of financial remuneration for these positions but face pressure to 
accept them if asked by the community. 
                                                 
 
11 The program required joint titling of unregistered plots of land for which it served as a “gender-equalizing reform” 
because sons tend to inherit more than daughters (Wiig 2013) 
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Figure 1. Map of the Lake Junín Area and the Communities Sampled in Our Study 
Notes: Each color represents the villages of each of the six peasant communities sampled in our study  
Source: Adapted from Benavides Ferreyros, Camino Ivanissevich, and Uganda Gómez (2008) 
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The general trend is for communities to grant most members with shared access to the 
communal lands used for grazing livestock. Most communities have also allocated a smaller 
portion of their lands to provide members with access to one plot for potato cultivation for their 
own consumption. There are some elements of private property rights in certain types of communal 
land. Some families might enjoy usufruct rights of communal land or might have inherited 
ancestral lands originally allocated to the communities’ founders. Although these lands are still 
legally owned by the community, users enjoy exclusive access to these lands and have a higher 
sense of tenure security. Inheritance of usufruct rights is usually only allowed in these types of 
land. 
It is important to note that not all communities have lands with elements of private property 
which might limit the livelihood options in those communities. For instance, maca cultivation, a 
local crop, is mostly found in ancestral lands, even though in theory many communities have not 
Table 1. Communal Norms Across the Peasant Communities in Our Sample 
 
 
Community Registration 
in favor of 
men
Members must 
be from whithin 
the community
Ancestral 
land 
Maca 
allowed in 
ancestral 
Maca 
allowed in 
communal 
Any land can 
be sold, rented
Inheritance/
Spliting of 
Land? 
Requisites to 
getting land
Pari + + + + - - - Apply 
Junin No, but only 1 
partner can be 
registered
+ - - - - -
5 years of 
participation in 
community
Huayre No, both 
partners can be 
registered
- + + + - +
5 years of 
participation in 
community
Ninacaca
- - +
Yes, only for 
consumption
NA
Can be rented 
for livestock
+
No available 
communal land
Matacancha
Yes and can 
only registered 
if married
- - NA +
Can be rented 
to family
-
Apply and be 
accepted by 
community 
members 
Chuiroc 
No, but only 1 
partner can be 
registered
+ - NA
Yes for 
consumption
- Only house
Apply and be 
accepted by 
community 
members
Notes: "+" indicates "yes" and "-" indicates "no"
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yet allowed this type of land use. Furthermore, farmers’ de jure and de facto rights are often 
different. Although in theory some communities might not allow inheritance of land, in practice 
farmers might be able to pass down their usufruct rights to their children. The discrepancy between 
de jure and de facto rights makes it difficult to account for each community’s tenure systems. Table 
1 summarizes how communal rules for land use vary across the six communities of our study. The 
data reported in this table is not an aggregate of individual data collected through our study’s 
surveys but was collected through interviews with community stakeholders. Although the table 
shows that inheritance of land is only allowed in two communities, the results of our household 
surveys indicate that inheritance of land occurs in all communities except for Matacancha.  
3.3 Livelihood Activities 
The peasant communities in our study area are mainly dependent on livestock production. 
The majority of the grazing livestock is sheep, but households perceived with having a higher 
socioeconomic status also raise cattle. Owners of cattle are engaged in dairy production which 
usually involves their own home production of cheese which is sold in nearby markets. Farmers 
are also involved in grazing alpaca and llamas, especially in the communities belonging to the 
province of Pasco. The main product of these animals is wool; however, their meat is also sold and 
consumed in this area of Peru. Agricultural activities are also important aspects of the livelihoods 
of these communities. However, potatoes and maca are the only crops that survive the harsh 
climatic conditions of this area. Potato cultivation for consumption is promoted by the 
communities through the allocation of plots of communal land for each household. The recent 
expansion of maca cultivation, on the other hand, has opened new opportunities for farmers who 
can either produce it or find temporary jobs processing or working in the maca fields.  
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Nearby mining activities as well as urban centers offer off-farm employment opportunities, 
especially for men, and represent an important force of permanent or temporary migration out of 
the communities. Women, however, are more restricted to farm activities where they have to 
endure harsh climatic conditions and take care of their domestic responsibilities. An increase in 
responsibilities of women within family farms and households as a result of migration of men has 
also been observed in other areas of Peru (Deere 1982). Many women farmers remain close to 
their traditions and continue to knit and spin clothing for their households or for additional income. 
Women occasionally receive opportunities for off-farm work under projects ran by the municipal 
governments to build or maintain public infrastructure. During our fieldwork, for example, public 
work in the main roads in the community of Huayre provided many women with temporary waged 
work. 
Section 4: Primary Data Collection 
This section is organized in two parts. First, we discuss our data collection process, surveys 
and the primary data we collected. The second part describes the Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI) in detail, how it was applied in our surveys, and the data we collected 
using this tool. 
4.1 Data Collection Process 
Data for this study was collected by the authors with support and input of the International 
Potato Center (CIP) staff members from October to December 2014. Local enumerators supported 
the interviewing process through which our data had to be collected due to the community 
members’ mistrust in written documents. The interviews followed a consistent format where all 
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the data in our surveys was obtained through interviews with survey participants. The interviews 
were recorded and transcribed to our survey forms. 
 Our study area included six different peasant communities surrounding Lake Junín in the 
High Peruvian Andes. These communities were included in our sample after the General 
Assemblies of the communities approved our study. Most members in these communities are 
livestock farmers who spend most of their time in fields far away from their homes grazing 
livestock. Because of the nature of their livelihood activities, the only way of finding participants 
was to visit them at their homes either very early in the morning or late in the evening once they 
returned from the fields. To make our sample random we selected only every other house and 
attempted several times to reach only those households. To account for the land rights differences 
our questionnaire included questions related to land use, tenure, perceived security, and 
inheritance. 
The data on demographics and assets were collected through household surveys 
administered to 233 households. To create an individual wealth index we included questions of 
households’ ownership of different durable assets. Our data includes detailed information of the 
intra-household distribution of all assets, including livestock, land, and capital. Individual surveys 
were also administered to the main adults in each household to collect data on influence over 
household economic decisions. To reduce social desirability bias, a pair of enumerators separated 
the two main adults while they were completing the individual survey to ensure answers were not 
influenced by potential conflict between household members. In single-headed households only 
the main adult was interviewed. The individual survey consisted of detailed information regarding 
the individual’s employment and the WEAI. Out of our 320 individual observations, 186 
participants were women and 134 were men. 
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4.2 Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI)  
We implemented the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) (Alkire et al. 
2013) in our individual surveys to get a comprehensive measure of influence in decision-making 
and empowerment. The strength of the WEAI is that it measures empowerment and agency of both 
men and women in 5 different domains relevant in agricultural rural communities: (1) decisions 
about agricultural production, (2) access to and decision-making power about productive 
resources, (3) control of and use of income, (4) leadership in the community and (5) time 
allocation. empowerment in other domains (Alkire et al. 2013). In section 5.1 we discuss in detail 
how the WEAI is consistent with our definition of empowerment. 
The WEIA has already been applied in various developing countries allowing for a robust 
comparison of empowerment across countries (Alkire et al. 2013). To make our survey more 
efficient and avoid overlaps between our household and individual surveys, we modified some 
questions in the WEIA. Figure 2 shows the domains and indicators collected in our modified 
survey. 
In the first domain in our WEIA survey we asked participants about their influence in 
decisions regarding the distribution of benefits, transactions, and inheritance of land and other 
productive assets owned or used by their household unit. To measure control and use of income 
we asked respondents if they had borrowed money from various sources in the last 12 months, and 
their influence over applying for and distributing that loan. In terms of income, we asked 
participants if they have funds that are exclusively managed and owned by themselves, how much 
money they make relative to their partners, and if they receive any sort of pension. In the leadership 
domain participants were asked if they were members or leaders of various groups including 
agricultural associations, women’s groups, or religious communities, and the extent to which they 
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influence decisions made within these groups. The time allocation domain asked participants to 
describe the numbers of hours they allocate in all the activities they undertake in a normal day. 
Lastly, we asked individuals to rate their satisfaction with the time they have left for leisure and 
resting. Table 2 provides a more detailed description of each component of the WEAI we included 
in our survey and the assets included in each question.  
Figure 2. Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index Domains and 
Indicators 
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Table 2. Explanation of Domains and Indicators from the WEAI in Our Questionnaire 
 
Indicator Explanation of variables 
Category 1*
Agricultural Land
Livestock
Commercial Crops
Rented Land
Goods
Transportation 
Category 2*
Bank
Friends or relatives
Category 3*
Agricultural Land
Livestock 
Commercial Crops
Rented Land
Expenditures
Category 4
Group membership
Public Speaking 
Category 5
Hours worked (paid and unpaid) Hours worked in paid and unpaid work tasks 
Leisure Time 1=satisfied with leisure time, 0=otherwise
Category 6 
Cows
Sheep
Alpacas
Llamas
Land 
* Answers are scored in terms of who makes the decision (1) respondent (0.72) respondent 
and other hh members (0.5) other members from the household or outside the household, 
respondent and partner, or no access to asset (0.25) partner and other members (0) partner 
1=comfortable with public speaking, 0=otherwise
Number of livestock owned by the 
individual either individually or jointly with 
other household members
Number of plots that the individual receives benefits from 
Category 1 measures the individual's 
contributions to decisions over buying, 
selling, or transferring different assets.  
Category 3 measures the individual's 
contributions to decisions over the 
distribution of revenue from different 
productive assets 
1=belongs to a social group, 0=otherwise
Category 2 measures the individual's 
contributions to decisions over credit from 
different sources
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Section 5: A Review of Empirical Models of Empowerment 
The objective of this section is to highlight the challenges of conducting empirical studies 
on women’s empowerment. First, we review the various definitions of empowerment across the  
literature. The second part of this section reviews the existing empirical studies and highlights their 
common measurement and methodological issues. To do so, we first discuss the challenges with 
measuring empowerment both indirectly using proxies and directly using outcomes or indicators 
of empowerment, particularly in light of the previous discussion about the conceptual definition 
of empowerment. We then separately review studies that treat empowerment as an observable 
variable and those that treat it as a latent construct. Finally, we discuss studies that address the 
endogeneity issues otherwise ignored in most empirical models of empowerment. 
5.1 Definitions of Empowerment in Empirical Studies 
According to (Alkire et al. 2013), the concept of empowerment is influenced by a person’s 
experiences, beliefs, aspirations, context and culture. Thus, empowerment has been defined in 
various ways by different researchers. The following is a summary of the most commonly cited 
definitions of empowerment. 
Empowerment is often defined in terms of women’s agency or their ability to make 
strategic choices about their lives based on what they value (Malhotra and Schuler 2005; Sen 1989; 
Kabeer 1999). Kabeer (1999) is often cited for developing the concept of empowerment further 
into a process that involves three dimensions: resources, agency and outcomes. Resources refer to 
pre-conditions such as access to assets or human capital required for women to exercise their 
agency. These resources have been further divided into sources and settings of empowerment 
(Kishor 2000). Sources are the assets that improve women’s sense of security and thus increase 
their bargaining power within their household. Settings of empowerment include women’s past 
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and current environments which facilitate or hinder their ability to exercise their agency. Agency, 
the second dimension described by Kabeer (1999) involves the action taken which includes 
decision-making processes and negotiation. Lastly, the outcomes refer to the well-being outcomes 
achieved as a result of women exercising their agency. In terms of Kaaber’s definition, empirical 
studies have focused more on analyzing the resources (such as access to assets or income) and 
outcomes of empowerment (such as child nutrition) often leaving agency aside (Alkire et al. 2013). 
Other definitions have described empowerment as a more complex concept that depends 
on more than just individual choices of women. For instance, the Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland 
(2006) definition of empowerment involves women’s agency as well as their ability to exercise 
their agency to achieve a desired outcome. Following the Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland (2006) 
definition, empowerment is also determined by the institutions that govern empowerment of 
women and whether they allow women to exercise their agency effectively. Similarly, other 
scholars have broadened their definition of empowerment to include how external factors and 
relationships enable women to exercise their agency. Narayan (2002) describes access to 
information, inclusion and participation, accountability and local organizational capacity as four 
main aspects of empowerment. Thus, Narayan’s definition of empowerment includes people’s 
connections with each other and their institutions rather than focusing on their ability to make 
individual choices. 
Despite the different definitions of empowerment, researchers have reached a consensus 
on certain features of empowerment such as its multidimensional nature (Samman and Santos 
2009). According to Samman and Santos (2009), empowerment can be exercised in different 
spheres, domains and levels. Spheres refer to the institutions that allow women to exercise their 
agency. Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland (2006) refer to these spheres when stressing the importance 
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of institutions in their empowerment definition. Domains represent the different areas of life in 
which an individual can exercise empowerment such as allocating household expenditures, 
influencing production decisions, practicing a religion, or having freedom of movement. Malhotra, 
Schuler, and Boender (2002) for instance, suggest that empowerment should occur in the 
economic, socio-cultural, interpersonal, legal, political, and psychological domains. Lastly, levels 
of empowerment refer to how individuals can exercise agency at the community, household or 
country levels (Samman and Santos 2009). Research often pays attention to women’s agency 
exercised at the household level also described as their intra-household bargaining power. 
From the various definitions of empowerment, we can conclude that empowerment is a 
complex process that involves individuals and institutions at multiple levels. For this study we will 
follow the WEAI focus on women’s agency and those aspects that relate to empowerment of 
women in agriculture exercised at both the household and community level  (Alkire et al. 2013). 
Our measure of empowerment and empirical methodology are also consistent with the 
multidimensional nature of empowerment. 
5.2 Measurement and Methodological Issues of Empirical Studies 
One of the reasons for the lack of evidence of the drivers of empowerment is the challenges 
associated with measuring empowerment. According to Samman and Santos (2009), the majority 
of empirical studies measure empowerment indirectly using proxies such as land ownership, 
ownership of assets and education. This approach has been strongly criticized because these factors 
are commonly considered preconditions of empowerment rather than indicators of empowerment 
(Govindasamy and Malhotra 1996; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 
2002). Alkire (2008) uses asset holdings to exemplify how some of these issues may arise. First, 
asset holdings might not translate to empowerment in the same way for different individuals. Using 
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asset holdings can also ignore the effect of different pathways, such as inheriting assets vs buying 
them, through which empowerment is affected. Finally, when asset holdings are used, increases in 
empowerment from other sources will not be accounted for (Alkire 2008). 
Only a few empirical studies of the drivers of empowerment attempt to measure 
empowerment directly (Samman and Santos 2009 provide an overview). Common measures in 
this literature include influence over household economic decisions, control and access to 
resources, and mobility which are commonly aggregated into indices (Jejeebhoy 2000). In other 
words, these studies treat empowerment as an observable variable. Common measures or 
indicators of empowerment in the literature are: economic, child related, and marriage related 
decision-making, mobility, power dynamics with husband, and access and control over assets 
(Jejeebhoy 2000). According to Samman and Santos’ (2009) review of the literature, the majority 
of studies use simple dependant variables where the correlates of women’s empowerment are 
analyzed using OLS or logit regressions. A common approach is to ask questions regarding one or 
more indicators and create a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the woman is considered 
empowered for that indicator. For example, Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley (1996) ran several logit 
regressions on each of eight binary indicators of agency in a study of the effect of credit programs 
on empowerment in Bangladesh. Other studies have also compared the effect of empowerment 
determinants on different indicators in a similar way (e.g., Hindin 2000; Hashemi, Schuler, and 
Riley 1996; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Mason 1998).  
Although various studies recognize the importance of measuring empowerment using 
different indicators, for empirical purposes most studies aggregate measures of different indicators 
into one index which is then used as the dependent variable in a multi-variate regression (e.g., 
Jejeebhoy and Sathat 2001; Schuler and Hashemi 1994; Wiig 2013). For example, Al Riyami, 
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Afifi, and Mabry (2004) create two different variables that sum up the number of binary indicators 
representing the decisions in which the woman had a say and the places the woman is allowed to 
visit.  In her study of land rights in Nepal, Allendorf (2007) also used an aggregated measure of 
empowerment calculated by adding the number of decisions in which the woman participates and 
is considered empowered. Other studies create an additional dichotomous variable to indicate that 
a woman is empowered if she has adequate levels of a certain proportion of all the indicators in 
their dataset (e.g., Speizer, Whittle, and Carter 2005; Hindin 2000; Garikipati 2008). Hashemi, 
Schuler, and Riley (1996), for example, ran an additional regression in their analysis of credit 
programs in Bangladesh where the dependent variable is binary and equal to 1 when a woman is 
considered to be empowered in five or more of their eight indicators of agency. 
Researchers agree that empowerment is a multidimensional construct with different 
domains that must be carefully considered (Isvan 1991; Kishor 1995; Beegle, Frankenber, and 
Thomas 2001; Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996; Mason 1998; Malhotra and Mather 1997; 
Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 2002). However, a review of the empirical literature on drivers of 
empowerment shows that studies commonly use rather simplistic measures of empowerment that 
often rely on aggregating information from different indicators into one dependent variable. This 
aggregation forces researchers to overlook the possibility that the determinants of empowerment 
may have different effects on different facts of empowerment. In fact, drawing from a study by 
Mason (1998) which provides evidence that the drivers of empowerment have different effects on 
different empowerment domains, we expect this possibility to be high. It has also been shown that 
empowerment in one dimension does not necessarily guarantee or enhance empowerment in any 
other dimension (Allendorf 2007; Mason 2005; Mason 1998). Thus, focusing only on one or a few 
dimensions could lead to conclusions that are not necessarily applicable to all dimensions of 
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empowerment.  Finally, another weakness of this aggregation is that it often assumes that each 
indicator has the same contribution to women’s empowerment. Even those studies that do not 
make this assumption rely on an arbitrary set of weights used to aggregate indicators into an 
empowerment variable (e.g., Ross et al. 2015). 
While most studies use empirical approaches that treat empowerment as an observable 
variable, fewer studies apply an approach that acknowledges the latent nature of empowerment. 
Narayan (2005) describes agency as a latent phenomenon that can only be deduced through its 
actions or results. While most scholars agree with this view, the majority of the empirical work 
reviewed so far does not have an empirical approach that accounts for the latent nature of 
empowerment. To our knowledge, Allendorf (2012) and Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2006) 
are currently the only two exemptions. In a study of family relationships and women’s 
empowerment in India, Allendorf (2012) measures empowerment based on decision-making over 
expenditures on eight items and mobility to various different places. This study uses exploratory 
factor analysis to create one factor to measure agency which was then used in an OLS regression. 
In another study of participation in microfinance programs and women’s empowerment in 
Bangladesh, Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2006) apply a structural equation model (SEM) where 
their latent empowerment is measured with 72 indicators that measure women’s empowerment in 
various domains including purchasing ability, access to resources, activism, household attitudes, 
and others. While most studies develop empowerment measures from observed indicators, these 
studies treat observable factors as indicators of a latent phenomenon. Thus, their approaches are 
more consistent with the widely-agreed notion that empowerment is an unobservable variable. By 
including various indicators, instead of aggregating them into one variable, these approaches are 
also more consistent with the notion of empowerment as a multi-dimensional construct. 
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A final issue in the existing literature is that the vast majority of studies ignore endogeneity 
issues (Trommlerová, Klasen, and Leßmann 2015; Samman and Santos 2009). To our knowledge 
there are only three studies that address endogeneity from reverse causality or unobserved 
heterogeneity by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods. Garikipati (2008) instruments the 
years of membership in a self-help group program in a study of the effect of a microcredit program 
on women’s empowerment in rural India. However, while 2SLS IV is appropriate for linear 
models, the study applies it in a limited dependent variable context. The second case is a study of 
the determinants of women’s empowerment in rural Bangladesh by (Anderson and Eswaran 2009). 
The authors correct the endogeneity bias from using women’s work activities and earned income 
by using household-agricultural and health shocks as instruments for their first-stage estimation. 
Similarly, Trommlerová, Klasen, and Leßmann (2015) also use a 2SLS method to correct for 
potential endogeneity issues of education, literacy, economic activity and wealth. They found that 
all their estimates using OLS and logit regressions were still significant except for literacy, wealth 
and gender. Other studies have not accounted for endogeneity issues but have econometrically 
avoided endogeneity by using instrumental variables in their estimations (e.g., Imai et al. 2014). 
We develop an empirical model that solves the issues discussed in this section. We use a 
Generalized Structural Equation Model (GSEM) that allows us to treat empowerment as a latent 
variable observed by several indicators belonging to different domains that are relevant to 
women’s empowerment in agriculture. By using this approach, we are not forced to aggregate the 
indicators or impose arbitrary weights on each indicator to create an empowerment measure. We 
also rely on our detailed survey data and use inheritance of land instead of ownership of land in 
our analysis. Using inheritance is better than using ownership, although there might still be 
36 
 
endogeneity across generations. Nevertheless, our inheritance measure is more robust to 
endogeneity than other measures typically employed in the literature. 
Section 6: Empirical Specification 
The following section is divided into three parts. First, we discuss the determinants of 
empowerment that will be used in our empirical model. This includes a summary of other studies’ 
findings of the drivers of empowerment included in our model. In subsection 7.2 we describe our 
empowerment latent variable and the influence indicators used in our measurement model. In 
subsection 7.3 we describe our econometric approach. This subsection describes Item Response 
Theory (IRT) and how it is applied to our analysis of women’s empowerment. Section 7.4 
describes our econometric model. Finally, we conclude the section by describing some of the 
challenges in assessing goodness of fit in GSEM models. 
6.1 Determinants of Empowerment 
Based on our field work and review of the literature (e.g., Samman and Santos 2009; 
Jejeebhoy 2000) we grouped the main determinants of women’s empowerment into three 
categories: assets and wealth, household characteristics, and community involvement. Within the 
category of assets and wealth we pay special attention to the allocation of land rights within the 
household to address our first objective. In this section we first review each determinant included 
in our model and the expected signs. Then, we include a rationale for including each determinant 
drawn from previous existing studies. 
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6.1.1 Assets and Wealth 
We expect that ownership and control over assets would have a positive impact on 
women’s empowerment. According to Doss (2013), assets can increase women’s bargaining 
power by increasing their options outside the household, providing income via rents or through 
their use in production activities, and increasing their sense of security. Interestingly, asset control 
has not been consistently found to be a strong predictor of empowerment especially when social 
norms, religion, or caste systems are important factors in the specific context being studied 
(Samman and Santos 2009). For instance, Allendorf (2007) found that in Nepal a woman’s place 
in the family structure is a stronger source of empowerment than her control over assets. Lokshin 
and Ravallion's (2005) study in Russia also suggest that ownership of assets or wealth does not 
necessarily translate to self-perceived levels of empowerment. 
Our sample includes peasant communities that are geographically close to each other and 
share very similar social norms, cultures, and religion. Thus, since these social factors are constant 
across communities, we expect differences in ownership of assets to have positive impacts on 
empowerment. Grazing cattle is perceived in the area as a sign of higher socioeconomic status 
possibly due to the potential for higher costs and earnings from dairy production. We expect that 
ownership of cows, included in our model as a binary variable showing whether the women’s 
household owns cows, is associated with higher empowerment. 
We also include individual wealth (wealth index) that accounts for different household and 
individual assets owned by the woman. Since it is likely that wealthier women have more access 
to land, it is necessary to separate these two effects to identify the actual effect of land rights on 
women’s empowerment. Our wealth index, therefore, does not include land rights. A positive 
coefficient on individual wealth would suggest that women’s ownership of assets and higher 
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socioeconomic status increase their empowerment. This relationship is expected in a context like 
rural Peru since women with less economic stress could have more flexibility to allocate their time 
in other activities outside their homes that could enhance their bargaining power. 
6.1.2 Land Rights 
To determine the effect of intra-household allocation of land rights on empowerment, we 
include three dummy variables in our first model: woman inheritance, man inheritance, and joint 
inheritance. These variables show whether the women’s household has land inherited by the 
woman only, by the man only, or by both. The control variable not explicitly included in our model 
represents women who live in households where no land has been inherited. Land ownership has 
only been included in three studies where it has been found to have positive impacts on women’s 
empowerment (Allendorf 2007; Wiig 2011; Mason 1998). Following the limited evidence, we 
expect that women living in households where they are the only ones who have inherited land will 
be more empowered than those living in landless households. As far as we know, only Wiig’s 
(2011) study in rural Peru has tested the effect of living in households where only the man has 
inherited land. Following the bargaining literature discussed in Section 2.2, we expect this variable 
to be negatively associated with women’s empowerment since the man is more likely to 
monopolize decision-making if he has a greater fallback position or income contribution. 
However, there is a possibility for this coefficient to be positive if women’s access to land inherited 
by other members is empowering in itself. Finally, we expect the coefficient on land rights 
inherited by both members to be positive since access to land at the household level could provide 
women with greater opportunities. 
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6.1.3 Household Characteristics 
The first set of household characteristic variables we include has to do with family 
structure. First, we include two dummy variables, single woman and woman only, indicating 
whether the woman is single or whether the woman used to be in a partnership that has now been 
dissolved due to a divorce, separation, or because she is a widow. The coefficients on these 
variables would show the impact of women’s marital status relative to women living in a couple, 
whether they are in a marriage or a consensual union. In the context of the divorce-threat models 
of bargaining power, it is expected that marital status will play a role in women’s decision-making 
power. Unmarried women, for example, might be more empowered given that they have the 
flexibility to continue with their education or work rather than having to engage in domestic chores. 
However, having been involved in a partnership in the past could also influence women’s decision-
making power. Marital status was included in Kamal and Zunaid's (2006) empowerment study in 
Bangladesh. The authors found that unmarried women are more likely to be empowered and the 
effect of marital status surpassed that of education. Even though Bangladesh is an extreme case 
where the average age at marriage is very low, we still expect marital status to determine 
empowerment in rural Peru. 
We also include three variables of family structure. Male adults and female adults are 
variables indicating the number of other male and female adults (over the age of 15 years old) in 
the household. We expect the presence of other male adults to have a negative impact on women’s 
empowerment since they could replace women’s role in decision-making. The presence of female 
adults is expected to be positively associated with women’s empowerment. Finally, we include 
children as a continuous variable of the number of children below the age of 15 years old present 
in the household. We expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative because as the number 
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of children increases the workload for women increases, and their time available to be involved in 
their household decreases. 
Education is commonly included in empowerment models and has been found to be an 
important predictor of different domains of empowerment (K. Gupta and Yesudian 2006; Malhotra 
and Mather 1997; Hindin 2000).  In some cases, the evidence shows that specific levels of 
education achieved, rather than a continuous measure of years of education, predicts 
empowerment. Speizer, Whittle, and Carter (2005) showed that having only primary education is 
associated with male-centered attitudes and beliefs in women in Honduras. Jejeebhoy (2000)  and 
Jejeebhoy and Sathat (2001) also showed that all levels of education were important predictors in 
Tamil Nadu, India, while in Uttar Pradesh, India and Punjab, Pakistan only secondary education 
was a significant predictor of women’s empowerment. 
Intuitively, we would expect education to increase empowerment by providing women 
with self-confidence, awareness, and more opportunities. However, when it comes to household 
economic decisions, the education level of women relative to their spouse or other male decision-
makers will determine women’s influence within the household. Thus, we include the household 
level variable education difference which is the difference between the man and the woman’s level 
of education.  We would expect that as the education gap increases in favor of the man, the woman 
could become less confident to participate in household economic decisions or to challenge her 
partner. In contrast, if a woman is relatively more educated than her spouse, we would expect her 
to have a greater influence within the household. This relationship would work differently for 
women who are either single or widowed since they might be the only individuals involved in their 
household’s decision-making. To account for this we estimate the education difference between 
the woman and the oldest man adult in the household who is assumed to take over the role of a 
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spouse as the primary decision-maker. In households where no other male figure is present we set 
the education gap equal to zero since we assume that there is no education advantage working 
against or in favor of these women. 
Finally, we included the member’s age as a determinant of empowerment. We expect older 
women to be more experienced and, thus, have more decision-making power. Many women in our 
sample, especially those living alone, are seniors and as such have been involved in the 
communities for various generations. We expect these women to be more respected among 
community members too. 
6.1.4 Community Involvement 
We include two dummy variables to account for community involvement: public speaking 
and group membership. Public speaking shows whether the woman feels comfortable speaking in 
community meetings and family disputes. Group membership shows whether the woman is part 
of any agricultural, social, women’s, or religious group. We expect both of these variables to be 
positively associated with empowerment since greater participation in their community could 
allow women to be more confident in participating in decisions made at the household and 
community level. 
Registration in the community is another factor that could determine women’s 
empowerment. When new households are formed, most communities allow for only one member 
in the household to be registered in the community. Although the partner of the registered member 
still enjoys the benefits of belonging to the community, in case of a separation or divorce the 
registered member is more likely to keep assets, such as land, which are managed by the 
community. Thus, if a woman is registered she might be more confident in challenging her partner 
since her fallback position is strengthen by the community. However, women that are empowered 
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are more likely to challenge the commonly patriarchal systems of communities and demand to be 
registered instead of their male partners. Therefore, we did not include registration in the 
community as an explanatory variable of women’s empowerment because it is endogeneously 
determined.     
6.2 Indicators of Women’s Influence over Household Economic Decisions 
As mentioned earlier, we treat our empowerment variable as a latent variable that is 
measured using a set of influence indicators. We consider the influence of women over 13 separate 
household economic decisions. The 13 influence indicators are drawn from the WEAI questions 
related to women’s influence in 3 broad categories: (1) purchase, sale, and transfer of assets and 
(2) access to and decisions over credit from the resources domain and (3) control over use of 
income from the income domain. Each influence indicator indicates the level of influence over an 
economic decision held by a woman relative to her partner (or in cases when they don’t have a 
partner, other adult decision-makers within the household). Each influence indicator is a discrete 
ordered variable with five categories indicating whether the decision was made by (1) the man 
alone (M) (2) the man and another household member (MO) (3) the woman and the man jointly 
(or in other words an equal balance of bargaining power within the household) (MW) (4) the 
woman and another household member (WO) or (5) the woman alone (W). Category 3 includes 
scenarios where decisions are made by other members in the household, by members outside the 
household, or where no decisions are made because there is no access to the specific asset. In these 
scenarios empowerment is assumed equal between partners. Figure 3 reports the distribution of 
observations in each category for one of our influence indicators—decision-making over buying, 
selling, or transferring agricultural land. For this indicator men are the sole decision-makers in 7 
households, women are the sole decision-makers in 29 households and there is some type of joint 
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influence in 102 households. Figure 4 reports the distribution of observations for all influence 
indicators used in our analysis. 
6.3 Empirical Approach 
6.3.1 Item Response Theory 
At the crux of our empirical approach is Item Response Theory (ITR). In many disciplines, 
scholars are often interested in studying latent or unobservable characteristics. The latent traits 
can’t be observed directly but can be measured using a set of items or questions. For example, a 
teacher interested in measuring statistical aptitude (the latent variable or trait) can administer a test 
with several questions (or items). IRT has been used in different applied disciplines such as 
psychometrics to develop links between observable measures of a latent trait and levels of the  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Responses for the Influence over Decision-making 
over Buying, Selling, or Transferring Agricultural Land 
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latent trait (e.g., Embretson and Reise 2000; Hambleton and Swaminathan 1985; Hambleton, 
Swaminathan, and Rogers 1991). For instance, IRT is used in educational testing to link students’ 
responses to different items (e.g., questions which require yes/no answers) to their latent ability. 
Computerized adaptive tests like the GRE and GMAT are based on IRT (Montgomery and Cutler 
2013). Other applications of IRT include the estimation of ideological ideal points of political 
figures (e.g., Martin and Quinn 2002; Bailey and Maltzman 2008) as well as variations of 
democracy within countries (Treier and Jackman 2008). In the development literature, application 
of IRT is limited. Das and Zajonc's (2010) study is a notable exception that used IRT to compare 
the distribution of cognitive skills of 9th grade children from the Indian states of Orissa and 
Rajasthan with international benchmarks. 
IRT can be understood with a simple example from the educational testing literature 
mentioned above. Standard testing methods report the grade of a student in one specific test and 
provide a measure of student performance on a test specific scale. Using the standard approach, 
the test scores of students of the same class offered on two equivalent campuses may not be 
comparable because they differ in two ways: a) difficulty - questions across 2 tests may have 
different levels of difficulty, and b) discrimination – questions may differ in their capacity to 
separate out high ability and low ability students. The higher the discrimination the better the item 
is at identifying respondents within a narrow range of ability. IRT provides an alternative to 
standard test scoring methods by identifying the two types of differences and providing a 
mathematical approach to remove the differences from the scores so all tests are on the same scale. 
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6.3.2 The Item Characteristic Curve 
The Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) is the fundamental concept in IRT. Both the difficulty 
and discrimination parameters are estimated using the ICC, a function that links individuals’ item 
response probabilities to the latent trait.  Figure 5 shows a hypothetical ICC for the education 
testing example. The figure plots the probability of a correct response to a test question or item as 
a function of underlying ability or the latent trait. The difficulty represents the level of ability at 
which a respondent is likely to provide a correct answer for an item. That is, the difficulty is the 
minimum level of latent ability (x-axis) where the probability of a correct response crosses the 
50% mark (y-axis). Similarly, the discrimination parameter is the slope of the ICC at the difficulty 
point (Figure 5). 
A formal expression for the ICC is given in equation S1 which expresses the probability of 
success as a function of latent trait lambda (assumed to be 𝑁~(0,1)), discrimination s, and 
difficulty d usually with a logistic specification for F: 
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𝑃(𝑄 = 1|𝜆, 𝑑, 𝑠) = 𝐹(𝑠(𝜆 − 𝑑))                               Equation S1 
𝑃(𝑄 = 1|𝜆, 𝑑, 𝑠) =
𝑒𝑠(𝜆−𝑑)
1 + 𝑒𝑠(𝜆−𝑑)
 
Often, the ICC is expressed in slope intercept form (for ease of computation see (Zheng and Rabe-
Hesketh 2007)): 
𝑃(𝑄 = 1|𝜆, 𝑑, 𝑠) = 𝐹(𝑠𝜆 − 𝑠𝑑) 
𝑃(𝑄 = 1|𝜆, 𝑑, 𝑠) = 𝐹(𝛽𝜆 − 𝛿) 
So that the discrimination and difficulty parameters are recovered in a second step such as: 
𝑠 = 𝛽; 𝑑 =
𝛿
𝑠
 
6.3.3 Application of IRT to Women’s Empowerment 
We apply the IRT model described above for our analysis of women’s empowerment. The 
items in our case are our 13 women’s influence indicators and the latent variable we consider is 
women’s empowerment. Unlike the standard model, our items are ordered discrete rather than 
binary variables. Due to the discrete nature of our items, we define our ICCs as the probability of 
a woman being in the highest category of decision-making (where women are the sole decision-
makers) as a function of her underlying empowerment12. Thus, we are going to focus on the 
probability of a woman being the sole-decision maker vs the man being the sole-decision maker. 
Our approach is comparable to the Graded Response framework which is a type of IRT model that 
is appropriate for categorical items and is estimable using GSEM methods (Samejima 1997). Note, 
                                                 
 
12 In our model each item is described by a discrimination parameter and between category threshold parameters that 
represent each category’s difficulty. Thus, each item will have one less difficulty parameter than the number of 
categories possible for that item. Each difficulty represents the latent trait level at which it is likely that an item’s 
response is above the threshold.  
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however, that the probability of the woman being the sole-decision maker with respect to each of 
the four other categories could also be computed. However, for the sake of brevity and the focus 
of my stud on women’s intra-household power, the most relevant categories are women and men 
as sole-decision makers. 
Difficulty and discrimination in the educational test literature allow researchers to remove 
item’s test-specific attributes thereby allowing tests to be put on a common scale so that students 
can be compared for example based on math tests across a cross section of countries. In our case, 
difficulty and discrimination provide us with novel policy information about each influence 
indicator. Specifically, they provide information on how different influences, each of which may 
be associated with a different development outcome, can be harnessed by empowering women. 
Figure 6 shows two hypothetical ICCs for two influence indicators with different difficulty values: 
Indicator 1 has a difficulty level that is located farther to the left of the latent variable axis. Thus, 
in the context of our study, the difficulty measures an influence’s threshold or the minimum level 
of empowerment required to turn on the influence. In Figure 6, influence indicator 1 has a lower 
threshold than indicator 2, suggesting that less empowerment is required to turn on influence 1 
relative to influence 2. That is, it is “easier” to turn on influence 1 through empowerment policies. 
Figure 7 shows hypothetical ICCs for two influence indicators with different discrimination values 
at their threshold or difficulty points. Influence 2 has a higher discrimination indicated by its 
steeper slope compared to influence 1. In the context of our study, the discrimination parameter 
measures an influence’s sensitivity or responsiveness to changes in empowerment. In Figure 7, 
influence indicator 2 is more sensitive to policy interventions that increase empowerment than 
influence 1. It is plausible that a woman’s influence over credit decisions may be highly sensitive 
to small changes in empowerment while her influence over livestock production may be less 
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responsive. This could be the case even if the influence over livestock sales has a lower threshold 
or is “easier” to turn on. Taken together, policy makers would benefit from targeting influence 
categories that have lower thresholds and are more responsive. 
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6.4 Empirical Model 
Our model involves two components, a measurement equation and a structural equation. 
For the first component, using IRT we specify latent empowerment as a continuous variable 𝜆𝑗
∗ 
measured by 13 influence items or influence indicators, 𝑖 = 1,… ,13 for each woman 𝑗. Given the 
discrete nature of the influence indicators, our measurement component is specified using ordered 
logits. The underlying continuous response 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  is estimated as a linear function of latent 
empowerment 𝜆𝑗
∗. 
𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝜈𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗ + 𝜀𝑗                                               (Equation 1) 
In Equation 1, 𝜈𝑖 is a constant term, 𝑠𝑖 is a factor loading associated with an influence indicator, 
and 𝜀𝑗 is assumed to be logistically distributed. Further, we assume that all items take on the 
ordered categories, 𝑘 = 0, … ,4 (where 𝑘 = 4 is woman as the sole decision-maker). As in standard 
ordered logit models, the observed outcome of each influence indicator 𝑄𝑖𝑗 is related to the 
continuous response 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  via a threshold model (Equation 1.a).13. 
𝑄𝑖𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 
0 𝑖𝑓 − ∞ < 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  < 𝑘1𝑖
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑘1𝑖 < 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  < 𝑘2𝑖
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑘2𝑖 < 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  < 𝑘3𝑖
3 𝑖𝑓 𝑘3𝑖 < 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  < 𝑘4𝑖
4 𝑖𝑓 𝑘4𝑖 < 𝑄𝑖𝑗
∗  < ∞
                                    (Equation 1.a) 
Therefore, the probability of a woman 𝑗 belonging to an empowerment category 𝑘 (e.g., sole 
decision-maker) with respect to indicator 𝑖 (e.g., control over credit) is: 
                                                 
 
13 Each cut-point dividing two categories has a different characteristic curve which is used to determine the difficulty 
parameter for each category. Thus, each item will have one less difficulty parameter than the number of categories 
possible for that item. The difficulty represents the latent ability level at which a random drawn individual is likely to 
respond above the cut-point.  
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  Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑘|𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗) =
exp {𝑠𝑖(𝜆𝑗
∗ − 𝑑𝑖𝑘)}
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝑠𝑖(𝜆𝑗
∗ − 𝑑𝑖𝑘)}
 
Where 𝑠𝑖 is discrimination parameter or empowerment sensitivity of influence indicator 𝑖 
and 𝑑𝑖 = (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝐾) is the difficulty threshold for each category of indicator 𝑖. 
We assume the outcome for all indicators must fall in one of the four categories of women’s 
influence. Thus, the probability of observing outcome 𝑘 is: 
Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘|𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗) = Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑘|𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗) − Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑘 + 1|𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗) 
The model parameterizes the probability of observing outcome 𝑘 using the slope intercept form 
as: 
Pr(𝑄𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑘|𝛿𝑖𝐵𝑖𝜆𝑗
∗) =
exp {𝛽𝜆𝑗
∗ − 𝛿𝑖𝑘}
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽𝜆𝑗
∗ − 𝛿𝑖𝑘}
 
And, since the model is estimated in slope-intercept form, a second step is required where we 
estimate the discrimination (or empowerment sensitivity) and difficulty (or empowerment 
threshold) using: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖𝑘 =
𝛿𝑖𝑘
𝛽𝑖
                                      (Equation 3) 
The second component of our model is the structural component which relates our 
empowerment latent variable, a continuous linear variable,  𝜆∗ to a set of observed determinants 
(Equation 4).  Our specification of observed determinants focuses on distribution factor variables 
that affect the intra-household distribution of power and attributes of women or individual 
characteristics which are expected to influence their empowerment. In Equation 4 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of 
individual characteristics that includes the variables from the assets and wealth, household 
characteristics, and community involvement categories which were described in detail in Section 
6.1. Summarizing briefly the discussion in Section 6.1, land rights are represented by three dummy 
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variables, 𝑊𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗 , 𝐽𝑙, that represent woman, male, and joint inheritance respectively. The land rights 
and education difference variables measure the distribution factors that are expected to determine 
the distribution of power within women’s households. The parameters to be estimated are 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝜇, 
and 𝜈 and 𝜀𝑗 is a non-systematic error that captures unmeasured determinants that vary across 
women. The coefficients on the land rights dummy variables represent the effect of each type of 
inheritance on women’s latent empowerment, holding everything else constant. 
𝜆∗ = 𝛼𝑋𝑗 + 𝛾𝑊𝑗 + 𝜇𝑀𝑗 + 𝜈𝐽𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗                                  (Equation 4) 
To better understand from a policy perspective what the empowerment thresholds and 
discriminations mean for peasant communities in rural Peru, we estimated the average level of 
empowerment in our sample. The mean empowerment level is predicted using the estimates of our 
GSEM model defined in equations 1 and 4. The predicted mean, estimated using Empirical Bayes, 
is the mean of the empirical posterior distribution using the estimated model parameters (see 
STATA manual 14 for more details on Empirical Bayes estimation). 
Our specification has three potential issues. First, we are not accounting for community 
effects which could influence the impact of land rights on women’s empowerment. Second, our 
basic model does not consider the amount of inherited land but only includes our land rights 
dummy variables. Although it would be ideal to have continuous data on land inheritance amounts, 
the data we collected on hectares of inherited land does not have enough variability in it.  
Third, as mentioned earlier, a strong assumption in our model in the way the data was 
collected was that that the influence indicators which were elicited through a series of questions 
are perceived in a similar manner by both men and women. Specifically, we assumed that a 
question regarding a woman’s influence over a household decision will be perceived and answered 
in exactly the same way. To account for differential item functioning (DIF), across men and 
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women, as a robustness check, we pool the data using only women’s responses that we use for our 
analysis above, with a dataset where men answered the same questions. The pooled sample 
contains both couples as well as single-heads of households. We estimate the larger IRT model 
with the pooled sample and test for DIF by testing the statistical significance of the coefficient on 
a variable denoting the sex of the survey respondent. The sex dummy variable is restricted only to 
appear in the measurement portion of the model and, thereby, captures differential attitudes and 
interpretations of the questions by men and women who have the same value of the latent trait.  
To address these issues, we ran four additional models to check for the robustness of the 
land right effects observed in our basic model. The first three additional models have different 
specifications of the explanatory variables of empowerment in Equation 4 and the fourth additional 
model accounts for DIF. The first additional model includes community dummy variables to take 
into account community effects. In the second additional model, we account for quantities of 
inheritance given our data (rather than using binary inheritance indicator). To do so we estimate 
the average amount of land in hectares that households inherited and created new land rights 
variables each of which has three categories: no inherited land, amount of inherited land below the 
average, and amount of inherited land above the average. Given the lumpiness of the inheritance 
variables this approach allows us to approximate the effect of larger and smaller inheritances 
without relying on the variability of the data. Our third additional model includes the new land 
rights variables plus the community dummy variables.  Finally, our fourth additional model 
accounts for DIF. To do so, we pooled our women’s sample with identical questions and other 
household data we had elicited by deploying a questionnaire for collecting a “men’s sample”. In 
fact, the larger pooled sample is more reliable in the sense that it yields greater degrees of freedom, 
however, we refrained from using it due to possible inconsistencies across gender in answering 
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the power questions. Our analysis in this model will allow us to do so by explicitly accounting for 
DIF in the model. We first transformed the men’s responses so that they are scaled to measure 
women’s empowerment on each of the influence indicators. In other words, if a man responded 
that he is the sole-decision maker of an influence, the corresponding score for that man’s influence 
would be a 0 because the woman has no power over that influence. In order to test if there are 
differences between men’s and women’s responses, an additional measurement component is 
added to our basic model. This component relates the responses to each of our 13 influence 
indicators to the individual’s sex through a sex dummy variable (1=woman).   
Recent advances in the literature allow estimation of Structural Equation Models (SEMs) 
where the indicators are ordered using generalized structural equation modelling (GSEM). This 
model allows the simultaneous estimation of the structural (a linear regression of latent 
empowerment on a set of observed determinants) and measurement component (a series of ordered 
logits relating our set of women’s influence indicators to latent empowerment). In our model, the 
two components are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood (Statacorp 2013). Figure 
8 illustrates the linkage between the measurement and structural equations. In the pathway 
 
Figure 8. Summary Diagram of the Linkage of the Measurement and 
Structural Component in our GSM Model 
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diagram, arrows show causal relationships, circles represent latent variables, and rectangles 
represent observed variables.  
6.5 Challenges Assessing Goodness of Fit in GSEM 
Although there are some options available to determine goodness of fit of latent variable 
models, statistical tests for GSEM are not available in most software. Ideally, the chi-squared test 
should be used to decide whether a model should be accepted or rejected. In the chi-squared test 
the null hypothesis is an exact-fit of the covariance matrix from the model and the observed 
covariance matrix. A rejection of the null hypothesis could indicate several issues including model 
misspecification, low sample size to parameters estimated ratio, and causal heterogeneity 
(Antokanis 2013). Failing to reject the null hypothesis implies that the model’s covariance matrix 
is consistent with the observed covariance matrix. However, even the chi-squared test presents 
challenges and should be carefully interpreted. For instance, an insignificant statistic does not 
strictly mean the model should be accepted but significant statistics could also be driven by large 
sample sizes (Kline 2011). Most software has not fully developed a GSEM feature yet and chi-
squared tests are usually not available. 
Other indexes such as the root mean squared of approximation (RMSEA) and the 
comparative fit index (CFI) are often suggested as alternatives to assess the fitness of GSEM 
models. However, these statistics are not robust and are also not available in most software for 
GSEM. The RMSEA is a measure of “badness” of fit of the model. When the RMSEA is 
significant and less than 0.05 the close-fit hypothesis can be accepted. On the other hand, the CFI 
compares how the model fit has improved in comparison to a baseline model where no parameters 
are freely estimated. A CFI below 0.95 suggests that there might be a flaw in the model’s 
specification (Kline 2011). These tests are less powerful and should be used collectively to identify 
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flaws in a model (Kline 2011). Some scholars caution against assessing fitness with these tests 
claiming that it is not possible to know how misleading these estimates are (Antokanis 2013). 
Thus, experts claim that these measures fall short of the chi-squared test (McIntosh 2012; 
Antokanis 2013). 
Because of the software limitations to assess goodness of fit, we employed a series of 
goodness of fit tests for thirteen regressions where each indicator is regressed on the explanatory 
variables of the structural equation. We assess the goodness-of-fit tests for these regressions to 
support our rationale for using each indicator in our measurement model.  
Section 7: Results 
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 232 households included in our data. The 
typical household in our sample has 4 members. Around 29 percent of the households have one or 
more children below the age of 12. At least one male, other than the women’s husband, is present 
in 34 percent of the households and at least one other female adult is present in 38 percent of the 
households sampled, possibly because it is common for people to take care of their parents once 
they become seniors and absorb them into their households. In terms of marital status, 42 percent 
of the households are headed by a man or woman only, while 40 percent are headed by a married 
couple. The high proportion of households headed by one individual, who in most cases is a 
woman, can be partly explained by the lesser opportunities for women to migrate. It is also 
common for men to abandon their partners after migrating to urban centers for better work 
opportunities. On the other hand, 18 percent of the households are headed by a couple in a 
consensual union. Consensual unions are common in the area because they are recognized as a 
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partner for legal matters in the community and the costs of marriage can be high. The table also 
shows the representation of each community in our sample. 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the individual characteristics of the participants 
of our individual survey by gender. In total we have 186 and 130 observations for women and men 
respectively. The descriptive statistics show some gender inequalities in respect to education and 
wealth. The average education level for men is 8.12 while the average education for women is 
4.89. In other words, a typical woman did not complete primary school while a typical male 
completed the second grade of secondary school. The large education gap could result from 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics at the Household Level 
 
Household Characteristics N Pecentage
Total observations 232
Average number of members per hh 4
Household Composition 
  Kids (1 or more) 68 29
  Male adults (1 or more) 80 34
  Female adults (1 or more) 87 38
Household Headship 
  Single-headed 97 42
  Two-headed Married 94 40
  Two-headed Consensual Union 42 18
Community 
  Junin 63 27
  Matacancha 5 2
  Huayre 64 28
  Ninacaca 70 30
  Chuiroc 10 4
  Chacpay 21 9
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families forcing young girls to stay at home taking care of the domestic responsibilities or helping 
out with livestock operations. On average, the wealth index for men is 3.53 while for women it is 
2.51. Higher access to education, relative to previous generations, in rural Peru allow young adults 
to access more opportunities in nearby urban centers creating a flow of young people out of rural 
areas. Thus, we see a high average age of 57 for both genders.  
 
 
A large proportion of women are registered in the community while only half of the men 
are registered. Registration in the community can be an important contributor of power within the 
household since it is common for communities to allocate land to households under the name of 
the registered member. Although it may seem from these numbers that women have more power 
and are more represented in the communities, a closer look at the marital status of our sample 
Table 4. Member Level Descriptive Statistics 
 
Individual Characteristics
Women Men 
Demographics 
  Education (1=1st primary, 15= University)   4.89 (4.06) 8.12 (3.69)
  Age 57.51 (14.63) 57.46 (15.54) 
  Wealth  (index) 2.51 (1.30) 3.53 (1.80)
Women Men 
Registered in the community  0.72 0.50
Marital Status 
  Single 13.9 10.77
  Divorced 0.53 0.77
  Separated 8.56 1.54
  Widowed 24.6 5.38
  Married 36.36 55.38
  Consensual Union 16.04 26.15
Total observations 186 130
Mean (SD) 
Percentage
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suggests a different story. The percentage of women that are single, separated, or widowed in our 
sample is greater than that of men for each category. In particular, the proportion of widowed 
women is five times that of men. Since a high proportion of women are not in partnerships, it is 
expected for them to be the members registered in their communities. 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the women’s empowerment drivers that are included in our 
structural model are reported in Table 5.14 The mean wealth index is 2.51 with significant variation 
around the mean across observations. Only 36 percent of the women in our sample live in 
households that own cows and could potentially be perceived as belonging to a higher socio-
economic class. The majority of women (65 percent) said that they feel comfortable speaking in 
                                                 
 
14 These statistics are estimated using the 186 women observations only 
Table 5. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Variable Description 
Mean Std. Dev.
Wealth 2.51 1.30 Index of individual wealth +
Cow ownership 0.36 0.48 Dummy variable: 1 if household owns cows +
Public Speaking 0.65 0.48 Dummy variable: 1 if woman feels comfortable speaking in public +
Group Membership 0.21 0.41 Dummy variable: 1 if woman participates in a social or leadership group +
Man inheritance 0.27 0.44 Dummy variable: 1 if only the man in the household inherited land -
Woman inheritance 0.29 0.45 Dummy variable: 1 if only the woman in the household inherited land +
Woman and man inheritance 0.02 0.15 Dummy variable: 1 if both the woman and the man inherited land +
Adult males 0.47 0.73 Dummy variable: 1 if there are other male adults in the household -
Adult females 0.54 0.74 Dummy variable: 1 if there are other female adults in the household -
Kids 0.55 0.94 Dummy variable: 1 if there are any kids in the household (12 or less) -
Woman only 0.34 0.47 Dummy variable: 1 if the woman is divorced, separated, or widowed +
Single woman 0.14 0.35 Dummy variable: 1 if the woman is single 
Education difference
-1.83 3.65
Difference in education level between female and male adult in the household (if 
woman only==1, members' age was used) +
Age
57.51 14.63 Member's age in years +
Women Predicted 
Sign 
Table 5. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Empowerment 
Structural Equation 
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public but only a small proportion (21 percent) participates in social, religious, women’s, or 
agricultural groups. Approximately half of the women’s households have other male and female 
adults present. This could include parents, parents-in-law, or adult children. Around half of the 
households have children below the age of 12 years. 34 percent of the women in our sample are 
heads of their households on their own after being divorced, separated, or widowed. In contrast, 
only 14 percent of our sample is single or has not been in a marriage or consensual union before. 
In terms of land, the descriptive statistics show some heterogeneity in distribution factors 
across the women’s households. Only 58 percent of the women in our sample live in households 
where land has been inherited. While there are slightly more women living in households were 
inheritance has only been acquired through the woman, only 2 percent of households have 
inherited plots through both male and female adults. 
Education was included as the difference between education of the main woman and man 
in each household. On average, women have less education than their partners; however, there is 
a large variance in the difference of education levels in our sample. The average age of women is 
57.51 but there is also a big variation around the mean for this variable. 
7.2 Structural Component Results 
Table 6 reports the results of the structural component (Equation 4) of each of our four 
models. The coefficients of the empowerment structural equation represent the effect of each 
variable on the latent women’s empowerment. 
In our basic model (Model I) the coefficients on the woman inheritance and joint 
inheritance variables suggest that there is a significant relationship between women’s land rights 
and women’s empowerment. First, similar to Allendorf (2007) and Mason (1998) we find that 
women living in households where only women have inherited land are more likely to have greater 
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Table 6. Results of the Structural Components of Women's Empowerment as the Dependent Variable 
 
Independent Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Wealth 0.15* 0.15* 0.15* 0.15*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Ownership of cows 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.32
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Group Membership 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.32
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
Public Speaking 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Woman inheritance 0.47* 0.31 0.40* 0.27
(0.27) (0.28) (0.23) (0.25)
Man inheritance -0.34 -0.50* -0.26 -0.41*
(0.25) (0.27) (0.21) (0.23)
Joint inheritance 1.4* 1.33* 0.76* 0.69*
(0.73) (0.73) (0.40) (0.40)
Male adults 0.37** 0.35** 0.37** 0.37**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Female adults -0.19 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Children 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Woman Only 2.7*** 2.75*** 2.71*** 2.77***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Single Woman 2.13*** 2.27*** 2.23*** 2.31***
(0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Education Difference* 0.04* 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Junin -0.89** -0.87**
(0.40) (0.41)
Matacancha -1.35* -1.35*
(0.72) (0.73)
Huayre -0.60 -0.60
(0.40) (0.41)
Ninacaca -0.48 -0.48
0.38 (0.38)
Chuiroc -0.37 -0.36
0.58 (0.58)
Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
Note: Stars indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and1%(***) levels
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decision-making power. The finding is consistent with the theoretical arguments that claim that 
land rights improve the fallback position of women and support the rationale for enhancing land 
rights as a development tool. Even though it has been argued that having formal rights, such as 
inheriting land, does not mean women control the land (Doss 2013), our model suggests that 
inheriting land is sufficient for increasing women’s intra-household power. The coefficients on the 
two other land rights variables provide additional information regarding the intra-family allocation 
of land rights and empowerment. While the coefficient on man inheritance is not significant, the 
coefficient on joint inheritance is significant and positive. Our model also suggests that this effect 
is greater than the effect of providing land rights to women only. Overall, these results provide 
strong evidence of, heretofore, unnoticed intra-family land allocation effects on women’s 
empowerment. 
As expected, the coefficient on our wealth index is significant and positive but women’s 
ownership of cows is not significant. Despite comments of community members about cows being 
a sign of higher economic status, our model suggests that women’s perceived status at the 
community level does not impact their decision-making within the household. In contrast, it makes 
sense for wealth to be significant and have a positive impact on empowering women since it 
provides women with more opportunities. For instance, if a woman has the ability to invest in her 
household’s livestock she will probably have a greater influence over the management and revenue 
from the household’s livestock operations.  
According to our results, neither belonging to a social or leadership group (group 
membership) nor women’s comfort in public speaking (public speaking) have significant effects 
on empowerment. These results suggest that empowerment at the household and community levels 
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could have different drivers. Alternatively, it is possible that other males in women’s households 
were equally involved in community groups, for example, for which a woman, highly involved in 
her community would not gain any relevant skills relative to other decision-makers within her 
household. The results of the household structure variables provide interesting evidence of the 
allocation of power among family members. We expected male adults and female adults to have 
negative impacts on women’s empowerment since additional adults in the households would 
normally reduce the woman’s opportunities to participate in economic decisions. However, our 
results show that additional male adults have a positive impact on women’s empowerment. It is 
common for older members to join their daughter's or son’s families once they reach a certain age. 
The positive effect of additional males could be attributed to the presence of a woman’s own family 
member who are males and who support her authority and power in the household. This variable 
also includes the presence of sons older than 15 years old who might not necessarily replace the 
woman’s place as a decision-maker. In many cases, the new generations are more engaged with 
off-farm activities which could contribute to male sons not being a threat to women’s influence in 
household decisions. Surprisingly, the effect of additional adult women in the household does not 
have a significant impact on empowerment. The effect of children in a household has been found 
to differ across empowerment studies; in our case, the effect is not significant. 
The effect of woman only, which includes women that are divorced, separated, or widowed, 
is significant and greater than the effect of any other determinant. This result is expected because 
our measure of empowerment is the women’s influence within the household relative to a partner 
or any other man. Thus, by not having a partner, women in this category will automatically appear 
as though they have more power. This dummy variable, along with the single woman variable, will 
purge out this upwards shift in empowerment. It is interesting to note that the effect of being single 
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is smaller than the effect of having a household headed by a woman only. Our results suggest that 
the dynamic of power during a partnership, or the process involved in dissolving this partnership, 
can increase a woman’s bargaining power even once the partnership is dissolved. 
The difference in education levels is a statistically significant determinant of women’s 
empowerment. In other words, an increase in the gap between the woman´s and the man´s 
education has a positive impact on women´s empowerment. The age coefficient is positive but 
does not have a significant effect. 
In conclusion, we find that in our basic model the factors that determine the distribution of 
factors within the household –intra-household allocation of land and education differences-have 
significant effects in women’s empowerment measured as their influence in household economic 
decisions. On the other hand, most women’s attributes, such as community involvement and age, 
are not significant determinants of their empowerment which is measured in our model as their 
intra-household bargaining power. The women’s wealth is the only variable that has a significant 
effect on women’s empowerment.  
 The results of our additional models further support that the intra-family allocation of land 
rights matters for women’s empowerment. When community effects are taken into account (Model 
II and Model IV) the results on the land rights variables change. First, unlike in our basic model, 
woman inheritance is not statistically significant and man inheritance is negative and significant. 
Most importantly, however, we see that in both models joint inheritance remains significant and 
has the greatest effect among the land rights variables. To test if the women’s empowerment effect 
is driven by community norms, we ran an additional model where we interacted the woman 
inheritance variable with each of the community dummy variables. Since none of the interactions 
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was statistically significant, we can conclude that the empowerment effects we have uncovered 
are not community specific.   
Our third additional model (Model IV) also supports the importance of woman and joint 
inheritance for women’s decision-making authority. Since the land rights variables are categorical 
in this model, the land rights coefficients represent the additional effect of being in a greater 
category of inherited amount of land relative to not inheriting any land. The results suggest that 
the quantity of land inherited through the woman or jointly has a positive effect on women’s 
empowerment. In other words, the effect of land inherited on women’s empowerment is greater if 
a woman inherits more land than the average amount of land inherited by women or inherited 
jointly.  
Table 7. Differential Item Functioning (DIF) (MODEL V): Measurement Component 
Results Showing the Effects of the Sex Dummy (1=woman) on the Influence Indicators  
 
Influence Indicator Coefficient St. Error
agricultural land (q1) 2.862 (0.432)***
livestock (q2) 3.888 (0.622)***
commercial crops (q3) - -
rented land (q4) 2.535 (0.763)***
goods (q5) 2.694 (0.488)*** 
transportation vehicles (q6) 1.28 (0.346)***
Applying and using credit from 
bank (q7) 1.126 (0.564)**
relatives or friends (q8) - -
Distribution of income from 
agricultural land (q9) 2.704 (0.429)***
livestock (q10) 2.829 (0.524)***
commercial crops (q11) 2.575 (1.091)**  
rented land (q12) 1.326 (0.541)**
Distribution of 
expenditures  (q13) 2.275 (0.347)***
Buying, selling or transfering
Note: Stars indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and1%(***) levels
Model V 
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Table 8. Differential Item Functioning (DIF) (MODEL V): Results of Structural 
Component of Women’s Empowerment as the Dependant Variable  
 
Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Model V 
Wealth 0.083
(-0.076)
Ownership of cows 0.32
(-0.236)
Group Membership 0.408
(-0.281)
Public Speaking 0.486
(-0.27)
Woman inheritance 1.047
(0.339)** 
Man inheritance -0.818
(0.287)** 
Joint inheritance 1.862
(0.825)*  
Male adults 0.146
(-0.163)
Female adults -0.163
(-0.172)
Children 0.1
(-0.138)
Woman Only 1.498
(0.332)** 
Single Woman 0.608
(-0.363)
Education Difference* 0.031
(-0.036)
Age 0.017
(-0.009)
Junin -0.249
(-0.435)
Matacancha -0.283
(-0.885)
Huayre -0.376
(-0.436)
Ninacaca -0.278
(-0.426)
Chuiroc -0.232
(-0.626)
Note: Stars indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and1%(***) levels
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Table 7 reports the measurement component (Equation 1) results of the respondent’s sex 
on 11 of our influence indicators. The influence over buying and selling commercial crops and the 
influence over credit from relatives could not be included in this model due to the lack of variability 
in their responses. The statistically significant coefficients on the sex dummy variable shows that 
DIF is indeed an issue in our data and that men and women have inherent differences to the 
empowerment questions regardless of the empowerment level in the household. This issue is found 
across all the influences included in the model. The positive sign on the DIF coefficient further 
tells us that the response to women having influence in household economic decisions is 
exaggerated when women answer the question rather than men. This could create significant bias 
in the land rights variable.  
To determine if our results hold once DIF is accounted for we look at the structural part of 
our fifth model reported in Table 8. We find that our three land rights variables are statistically 
significant. The woman inheritance and joint inheritance remain positive, with joint inheritance 
having the greatest effect on empowerment. The man inheritance variable, on the other hand, is 
negative. Our results show that inherited land by the man only has a negative effect on women’s 
empowerment. Thus, the findings from this model are qualitatively consistent with our previous 
results. In addition, a critical finding in the DIF model is striking evidence of a negative externality 
of men inheriting land on women’s empowerment.  
 Overall, we provide some evidence that women’s inheritance matters for women’s 
empowerment but we have more robust evidence that joint inheritance matters more. Our 
additional models provide strong evidence of the intra-family land rights effects.  
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7.3 Measurement Component Results 
The measurement equation (Equation 1) results from our basic model (Model I) were used 
to estimate our influence thresholds and sensitivities following the necessary transformations from 
Equation 3. The estimates reported in Figure 9 represent the predicted mean latent empowerment 
and the influence thresholds (or their difficulties) which indicate the level of latent empowerment 
required to make a woman the sole decision-maker in an influence relative to a base category15- 
influence over buying, selling or transferring agricultural land. The influence types are organized 
from lower to higher thresholds to ease the comparison between the influence indicators. Since the 
empowerment thresholds are a function of two random variables (see Equation 3) we can assume 
that the thresholds are statistically significant if both the discrimination factor and the threshold 
cut-point are significant. This is the case for all influences except for the influence over credit from 
relative or friends. Thus, this influence is excluded from our analysis.  
First, we can see that the predicted mean latent empowerment is lower than any of the 
empowerment thresholds reported in Figure 9. Thus, on average, women are not empowered 
enough to be the sole-decision makers in any of the influences. The low mean predicted latent 
empowerment shows there is significant room for empowerment policies that could benefit the 
peasant communities in our study.  
The results show that influence over transfer and revenue distribution of livestock have 
lower thresholds, that is they require low levels of empowerment relative to the other indicators. 
These results are optimistic provided that grazing livestock is the main livelihood activity of 
                                                 
 
15 All indicators had significant loading factors, except for influence over applying or using credit from relatives or 
friends. Thus, this indicator was excluded from our analysis.  
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women; if development programs empower women it is almost guaranteed that women will gain 
more influence over their most important activity. The influence with the next lowest threshold is 
the purchase and sale of goods for the household. Influence over agricultural land and influence 
over expenditures have similar thresholds and are also among the “easiest” influences to achieve 
for policy-makers. Since agricultural land is required for grazing livestock, increasing women’s 
 influence on these decisions allows women to be more autonomous in how they manage their 
livestock activities. Furthermore, knowing that changing women’s influence over expenditures 
made in the household requires relatively low levels of empowerment is helpful for development 
programs that aim to increase household’s well-being through the adoption of specific goods. For 
example, if a development policy seeks to address health concerns by increasing the adoption of 
improved stoves, empowering women could be a tool to achieve this goal as long as women have  
 
 
Figure 9. Empowerment Threshold of Each Indicator in the Measurement Component 
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different preferences regarding this technology. In fact, empowerment could be preferred over  
other policy tools since it would also unleash other positive impacts on women’s and household’s 
welfare.  
The remaining influences have higher thresholds or are endorsed by women at rather higher 
levels of empowerment. These results provide insights regarding the plight of women in these 
peasant communities. First, high amounts of empowerment are required to turn on the influence 
over purchase or sale of vehicles in the household. Women’s exclusion from these decisions could 
contribute to their lack of means of transportation to nearby towns and cities where alternative 
occupations are available. The exclusion of women from influences that could help them to 
diversify their livelihoods could further exacerbate their dependence on grazing livestock, placing 
them in a vulnerable position as resources such as land become scarcer or climatic conditions 
become harsher as a result of climate change. 
 The influence indicators of production and income distribution from commercial crops 
also have high thresholds and require high levels of empowerment to occur. These results suggest 
that it would require more resources to empower women to a point that facilitates their options to 
diversify their livelihoods or to a point where they can control the production of crops.  
The influence indicators for applying to credit and managing credit from banks also have 
high thresholds. It is possible that women’s exclusion from these decisions hinders their ability to 
access any credit. Thus, their possibilities of engaging into activities that require investments (e.g. 
small businesses) are slim. Finally, the other indicators with high thresholds are the influence over 
renting out land and influence over controlling the distribution of revenue from rented land. These 
results raise more concerns about women’s wellbeing since renting out land is becoming an 
important source of income as a result of the scarcity of land.  
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Figure 10 shows the results of the empowerment sensitivities as estimated from our 
measurement model. These are the discrimination parameters which show, conditional on the 
threshold points, how sensitive is an influence to a small change in empowerment. In Figure 10 
the types of influence are ordered from most sensitive to least sensitive to changes in 
empowerment. The discrimination parameters are the coefficients reported in STATA. All 
influences were significant except for the influence over credit from friends or relatives.   
 
 
First, we will focus on the influence indicators that are highly sensitive to changes in 
empowerment. For these influences, small changes in empowerment would result in large 
increases in the probability of women having sole decision-making power over an influence. The 
influences with the highest sensitivities are the influence over buying and selling livestock and the 
Figure 10. Empowerment Sensitivities of Each Indicator in the Measurement Component 
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influence over income from livestock. This again is optimistic from a policy perspective since 
policies that empower women would also have a large impact on the likelihood of women 
influencing the management of their primary livelihoods. The influence over buying and selling 
goods and commercial crops and the distribution of income from agricultural land are also highly 
sensitive. The influences on income distribution from commercial crops, buying and selling 
agricultural land, and expenditures are somewhat sensitive to changes in empowerment. 
On the other hand, decisions over renting out land and credit from banks have the lowest 
empowerment sensitivities. In other words, small changes in empowerment would not induce large 
changes in the probability of women being sole-decision makers in those influences. These 
influences also have high thresholds and would therefore not be recommended as targets for 
development policies. Lastly, buying or selling transportation vehicles also has a low sensitivity 
to changes in empowerment. 
Table 9. Indicators of Empowerment by Empowerment Threshold and Sensitivity Parameters 
 
 
Buying or selling commercial crops Buying or selling goods
Distribution of income from livestock 
Buying or selling livestock
Buying or selling transportation Buying or selling agricultural land
Expenditures 
Transferring of rented land 
Bank credit
E
m
p
o
w
e
r
m
e
n
t 
S
e
n
si
ti
v
it
y
High 
High> 1 
Low <1
Distribution of income from 
commercial crops
Distribution of income from agricultural 
land 
Empowerment Threshold*
Low 
Distribution of income from rented 
land 
*Thresholds are considered high or low depending on whether they are higher or lower than the threshold 
for buying or selling agricultural land (the control indicator) 
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Table 9 provides a summary of where the indicators fall in terms of the two influence 
parameters. Some influences with high influence thresholds, such as transportation decisions and 
decisions around renting land, have low sensitivities to changes in empowerment. Thus, it would 
not be efficient for empowerment policies to target these indicators to achieve development 
outcomes. On the other hand, indicators with high thresholds and high sensitivities would be 
difficult (since they would require high levels of empowerment to occur) but effective if targeted 
by empowerment policies (since they are very responsive once the necessary level of 
empowerment is achieved). These indicators could be considered as policy targets depending of 
the context of the development project. The most attractive influence indicators for policy-makers 
are those with low empowerment thresholds and high sensitivities. In this case the most attractive 
indicators are: distribution of income from agricultural land, buying or selling goods, distribution 
of income from livestock and buying or selling livestock. A further exploration of how these 
parameters can be used to evaluate alternative policies is provided in Appendix A. 
7.4 Goodness of Fit Tests 
Table 10 reports the goodness of fit results for the thirteen ordered logit regressions where 
each indicator is modeled as a function of the explanatory variables in the structural equation. We 
can conclude from the chi-square tests for the regressions that the indicators can be directly 
explained by at least one determinant in our structural model. The only two indicators where the 
null hypothesis in the chi-squared test cannot be rejected are our two measures of commercial 
crops. These indicators could be problematic due to the low number of observations producing 
maca, the only commercial crop in the area, in our sample. Our conclusions about land rights still 
apply once these indicators are removed from the model. 
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Table 10. Goodness of Fit Statistics of the Ordered Logit Regressions of Each Indicator as a 
Function of the Independent Variables in Our Structural Component 
 
Section 8: Discussion and Policy Implications 
Our first objective was to determine how the intra-household allocation of land rights 
affects women’s empowerment in rural Peru. The results of our structural component suggest that, 
as predicted by the intra-household bargaining literature, there is a positive effect of women’s land 
inheritance on women’s empowerment. Following the literature, we would also expect that if a 
man has more land rights relative to his wife or conjugal partner, the woman would have a weaker 
fallback position and, therefore, less influence within the household. However, the results in our 
first four models show that the effect of man’s inheritance is not statistically significant. This could 
be because the effect of the relative advantage of male’s land rights could be cancelled by the 
Chi-square Prob>chi-squared
agricultural land (q1)*** 117.48 0.0000
livestock (q2)*** 123.21 0.0000
commercial crops (q3) 19.92 0.1328
rented land (q4)*** 41.92 0.0001
goods (q5)*** 189.76 0.0000
transportation vehicles (q6)*** 101.2 0.0000
Applying and using credit from 
bank (q7)*** 125.67 0.0000
relatives or friends (q8)*** 158.23 0.0000
Distribution of income from 
agricultural land (q9)*** 123.82 0.0000
livestock (q10)*** 146.92 0.0000
commercial crops (q11) 14.26 0.4306
rented land (q12)*** 44.42 0.0001
Distribution of 
expenditures  (q13)*** 215.83 0.0000
Buying, selling or transfering
Indicator
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possibility of some of men’s land falling into the women’s possession, and thus improving her 
fallback position, if the partnership is dissolved. Wiig's (2011) findings from qualitative interviews 
indicate that women in peasant communities in rural Peru might benefit from men’s or joint land 
rights after a separation or divorce for three reasons (1) land inheritance to a spouse is perceived 
to be an inheritance to the couple as a unit (2) land can be given as a compensation if the man is 
considered guilty for the partnership ending and (3) land might be given to the woman if she is the 
primary caregiver of any children. It is possible that effect of the possibility of acquiring men’s 
land after a divorce or separation has a greater impact when there is joint inheritance, making the 
coefficient of joint inheritance the largest coefficient among our land rights variables. However, a 
closer examination of our fifth model’s results suggests that DIF effects could explain the lack of 
significant results on the effect of men’s land rights on women’s empowerment. Our results 
support the use of land rights to empower women and show that policymakers need to consider 
the intra-household distribution of land rights to maximize the empowerment effect of 
development policies. 
Our findings also provide new information that could be used by policymakers to increase 
women’s empowerment in peasant communities in rural Peru. Women’s land rights have been 
promoted throughout Peru both through policies, the most notable being the PETT program, and 
through research studies that link land rights to women’s empowerment. However, the PETT 
program did not allocate land titles in peasant communities. Thus, the policy implications from the 
existing literature that shows a linkage between land titles and development outcomes, including 
women’s empowerment, are not applicable to peasant communities. In contrast, promoting 
women’s or joint land inheritance in peasant communities is a feasible alternative. Since male 
inheritance is strongly preferred in the Peruvian highlands (Wiig 2011), future empowerment 
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policies could promote women’s and joint inheritance. It is possible that achieving this goal 
requires collaboration with peasant communities so that the institutions regarding inheritance of 
land rights are not biased against women. For instance, in some of the communities of our study 
women were pressured into registering as community members under their spouses’ name. Some 
women feared that they would be more likely to lose their inherited land in case of a divorce if 
they were registered under their spouses’ name. The possibility of their daughters’ land being taken 
away could motivate parents to prefer transferring their land to their sons. Ensuring that the norms 
around transfers of land are not threatening women’s land rights could promote the equal 
distribution of land rights across generations.16 
Our second objective was to explore how women’s empowerment is linked to the different 
types of influences in our model. We identify the influences that would be most attractive from a 
policy perspective in terms of the level of empowerment needed for women to be the sole decision-
makers over an influence and the influence’s sensitivities. Our analysis provides policy-makers 
with ex-ante information about the linkage between women’s empowerment and a desired policy 
outcome. By identifying the threshold and sensitivity of the influences, policymakers could more 
easily choose between policy alternatives. In a sense if we think of different development outcomes 
Y1 (children’s education/ nutrition) or alternatively Y2 (entrepreneurship), both functions of 
women’s influences, then one can imagine that the two development outputs use different 
influences with different intensities. This is similar to the way that physical outputs use labor and 
capital with different intensities. Understanding the threshold and the sensitivity of each influence 
                                                 
 
16 Wiig (2011) argues that the equal distribution of land rights between daughters and sons is essential to ensure that 
the effects of the PETT program persist across generations 
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in this context can provide policymakers with critical information about what type of development 
outcomes can be attained from gender policies.  
Section 9: Limitations and Conclusions  
We examine the role of land rights and the intra-family distribution of land rights on 
women’s empowerment in peasant communities in Peru. We use the Generalized Structural 
Equation Modelling (GSEM) to model women’s empowerment as a latent variable measured by 
thirteen indicators and determined by observable variables common in the existing literature. 
Through this econometric method we address measurement issues present in the women’s 
empowerment literature. Furthermore, our use of data on land inheritance allows us to solve some 
of the endogeneity problems found in previous land rights and empowerment studies and provide 
relevant policy implications for peasant communities in rural Peru. 
9.1  Limitations and Future Research 
Although our study addresses important shortcomings in the few studies of women’s 
empowerment and land rights, future research could expand the measurement of land rights 
making it more comprehensive. A limitation of our study is that we could not collect data on tenure 
security because of the sensitivity of discussing land rights in our study area. However, tenure 
security is likely important since the peasant communities are the owning entities of the land. 
Additional and accurate data on each household’s amount of land, with enough variability, would 
also improve the study allowing for quantity effects to be taken into account. Additional data on 
other rights would allow us to construct different proxies of land rights which could be used to 
compare our measure with other land rights measures.  
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Future studies and additional data could also include a stricter definition of intra-household 
bargaining power by only pooling couples’ observations. Given the high rate of migration out of 
peasant communities, it was often challenging to find both adults in dual-headed households. Thus, 
our dataset does not contain enough couples’ observations to run separate models on couples and 
single-headed households.  
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, a limitation of GSEM is the lack of available goodness-
of-fit tests in most econometrical software. Although we attempted to justify the validity of our 
model by running separate goodness-of-fit tests on the empowerment indicators, more appropriate 
tests would allow us to compare alternative models and improve the model’s specifications. Future 
advances in the available software will be beneficial for future empirical studies using GSEM.  
9.2 Conclusions 
Despite these limitations, our results provide robust evidence to support the use of land 
rights to achieve development goals. We also show the importance of considering the intra-
household allocation of land rights to increase the effectiveness of development policies. We find 
that the effect of land rights inherited only by women is significant and positive on women’s 
empowerment. However, the effect of land inherited by both the man and the woman in a 
household is significant and greater than other determinants of empowerment such as education 
and ownership of assets. These results remain constant across four different specifications of our 
model, providing robust evidence of the importance of joint inheritance of land on women’s 
empowerment. One of our additional models suggests that once DIF effects are taken into account, 
men’s inheritance has a negative externality on women’s empowerment.  
We also provide an additional analysis of the indicators used in our model using Item 
Response Theory. Our results suggest that while high levels of empowerment are needed to 
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achieve women’s influence over decisions regarding credit from banks and renting out land, these 
areas are the most responsive to changes in empowerment. Thus, our analysis suggests areas that 
policymakers can focus on to promote women’s wellbeing in rural Peru. In addition, our GSEM 
methodology allows us to estimate the mean level of empowerment in our study area. Our results 
show that the mean level of empowerment is lower than all of the empowerment thresholds of our 
influence indicators. In other words, we show evidence that those influence which require high 
levels of empowerment, which happen to be the influences necessary for women to access other 
livelihood opportunities, are not achievable short-run targets for policy-makers. In contrast, given 
the mean level of empowerment, those influences related to livestock, which are also critical for 
women given their importance in their livelihoods, are areas where policies could focus on right 
away.   
The policy attention and studies on land rights in Peru have so far only focused on the 
impacts of land titling primarily as a result of the PETT program. Wiig (2013) is the only study 
that analyzes the impact of joint land titles in rural communities in Peru. However, the findings of 
Wiig’s study only apply to the impacts of land titling on unrecognized communities where land is 
not owned by the community and the PETT program was able to distribute land titles. Since Peru’s 
focus on land rights has been limited to the PETT program, the potential for land rights policies in 
recognized communities has received little attention. Despite land in communities being legally 
owned by the community, our study provides evidence of how inheritance of user rights can still 
be used as a policy lever to induce empowerment and reach development outcomes. 
 
 
 
80 
 
Works Cited 
ActionAid. 2013. “From Marginalisation to Empowerment: The Potential of Land Rights to 
Contribute to Gender Equality – Observations from Guatemala, India and Sierra Leone.” 
http://actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/from_marginalisation_to_empowerment_-
_land_rights_and_women.pdf. 
Agarwal, B. 1994. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1997. “‘Bargaining’ and Gender Relations: Within and beyond the Household.” Feminist 
Economics 3 (1): 1–51. 
Al Riyami, A., M.U. Afifi, and R.M. Mabry. 2004. “Women’s Autonomy, Education and 
Employment in Oman and Their Influence on Contraceptive Use.” Reproductive Health 
Matters 12 (23): 144–54. 
Ali, D.A., K. Deininger, and M. Goldstein. 2014. “Environmental and Gender Impacts of Land 
Tenure Regularization in Africa: Pilot Evidence from Rwanda.” Journal of Development 
Economics 110: 262–75. 
Alkire, S. 2008. “Concepts and Measures of Agency.” Queen Elizabeth House, University of 
Oxford, No. ophiwp010, . 
Alkire, S., R. Meinzen-Dick, A. Peterman, A. Quisumbing, G. Seymour, and A. Vaz. 2013. “The 
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index.” World Development 52: 71–91. 
Allendorf, K. 2007. “Do Women’s Land Rights Promote Empowerment and Child Health in 
Nepal?” World Development 35 (11): 1975–88. 
———. 2012. “Women’s Agency and the Quality of Family Relationships in India.” Population 
Research and Policy Review 31 (2): 187–206. 
Alsop, R., M.F. Bertelsen, and J. Holland. 2006. Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to 
Implementation. World Bank Publications. Washington, DC. 
Anderson, S., and M. Eswaran. 2009. “What Determines Female Autonomy? Evidence from 
Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (2). Elsevier B.V.: 179–91. 
Angulo Patrolongo, F. 2009. “Peru.” In Important Bird Areas Americas - Priority Sites for 
Biodiversity Conservation, edited by C Devenish, D. F. Díaz Fernández, R. P. Clay, I. 
Davidson, and I. Yépez Zabala, BirdLife C, 307–16. Quito: BirdLife International. 
Antokanis, J. 2013. “Re: St: Goodness-of-Fit Tests after -Gsem-.” Stata Email List. 
81 
 
Bailey, Michael A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. “Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law 
and Policy Pref- Erences on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 
102 (3): 369–84. 
Basu, K. 2006. “Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously 
Determined Balance of Power.” The Economic Journal 116 (511): 558–80. 
Beegle, K., E. Frankenber, and D. Thomas. 2001. “Bargaining Power Within Couples and Use of 
Prenatal and Delivery Care in Indonesia.” Studies in Family Planning 32 (2): 30–146. 
Benavides Ferreyros, I., J. L. Camino Ivanissevich, and J. Uganda Gómez. 2008. “Reserva 
Nacional de Junín- Plan Maestro 2008-2012.” 
Budlender, D., and E. Alma. 2011. Women and Land. Securing Rights for Better Lives. Ottowa: 
International Development Research Center. 
Clément, C., J. Kneubühler, A. Urwyler, U. Witschi, and M. Kreuzer. 2010. “Effect of Maca 
Supplementation on Bovine Sperm Quantity and Quality Followed over Two Spermatogenic 
Cycles.” Theriogenology 74 (2): 173–83. 
Das, J., and T. Zajonc. 2010. “India Shining and Bharat Drowning: Comparing Two Indian States 
to the Worldwide Distribution in Mathematics Achievement.” Journal of Development 
Economics 92 (2). Elsevier B.V.: 175–87. 
De Haan, S., and H. Juárez. 2010. “Land Use and Potato Genetic Resources in Huancavelica, 
Central.” Journal of Land Use Science 5 (3): 179–95. 
Deere, C.D., R.L. Durán, M. Mardon, and T. Masterson. 2004. “Female Land Rights and Rural 
Household Incomes in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru,” 1–9. 
Deere, C.D., and M. Leon. 2003. “The Gender Asset Gap: Land in Latin America.” World 
Development 31 (6): 925–47. 
Deere, C.D., and J. Twyman. 2012. “Asset Ownership and Egalitarian Decision Making in Dual-
Headed Households in Ecuador.” Review of Radical Political Economics 44 (3): 313–20. 
Doss, C. 2013. “Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries.” 
World Bank Research Observer 28 (1): 52–78. 
Due, J.M., and C.H. Gladwin. 1991. “Impacts of Structural Adjustment Programs on African 
Women Farmers and Female-Headed Households.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 73 (5): 1431–39. 
Duflo, E. 2003. “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold 
Allocation in South Africa.” The World Bank Economic Review 17 (1): 1–25. 
Embretson, S. E., and S. P. Reise. 2000. Item Response Theory for Psychologists. Mahwah, NJ: 
82 
 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Estudillo, J. P., A.R. Quisumbing, and K. Otsuka. 2001. “Gender Differences in Land Inheritance, 
Schooling and Lifetime Income: Evidence from the Rural Philippines.” Journal of 
Development Studies 37 (4): 23–48. 
FAO. 2010. “Gender and Land Rights Database.” http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-
database/en/. 
———. 2011. “The State of Food and Agriculture. Women in Agriculture: Closing the Gender 
Gap for Development.” Rome. 
Field, E. 2011. “Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru.” Princeton 
Law & Public Affairs Working Paper, (02-1). 
Garikipati, S. 2008. “The Impact of Lending to Women on Household Vulnerability and Women’s 
Empowerment: Evidence from India.” World Development 36 (12). Elsevier Ltd: 2620–42. 
Gates, M. 2014. “Putting Women and Girls at the Center of Development.” Science 345 (6202): 
1273–75. 
Gonzales, G.F., A. Cordova, K. Vega, A. Chung, A. Villena, and C. Góñez. 2003. “Effect of 
Lepidium Meyenii (Maca), a Root with Aphrodisiac and Fertility-Enhancing Properties, on 
Serum Reproductive Hormone Levels in Adult Healthy Men.” Journal of Endocrinology 176 
(1): 163–68. 
Govindasamy, P., and A. Malhotra. 1996. “Women’s Position and Family Planning in Egypt.” 
Studies in Family Planning 27 (6): 328–40. 
Greene, W.H., and D.A. Hensher. 2009. “Modeling Ordered Choices.” Unpublished Manuscript, 
1–278. 
Gupta, G.R. 2009. “When Women Farm Crops and Economies Grow.” De Moines Register., 
October. 
Gupta, K., and P.P. Yesudian. 2006. “Evidence of Women’s Empowerment in India: A Study of 
Socio-Spatial Disparities.” Geojournal 65 (4): 365–80. 
Haddad, L., J. Hoddinott, and H. Alderman. 1997. Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in 
Developing Countries: Models, Methods, and Policy. Bltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press for the IFPRI. 
Hambleton, R.K., and H. Swaminathan. 1985. Item Response Theory: Principles and Applications. 
Boston: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Hambleton, R.K., H. Swaminathan, and H.J. Rogers. 1991. Fundamentals of Item Response 
Theory. California: Sage Publications. 
83 
 
Harper, C., K. Nowacka, H. Alder, and G. Ferrant. 2014. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment 
and Social Transformation in the Post-2015 Agenda.” ODI and OECD. 
Hashemi, S., S.R. Schuler, and A.P. Riley. 1996. “Rural Credit Programs andWomen’s 
Empowerment in Bangladesh.” World Development 24 (4): 635–53. 
Hindin, M.J. 2000. “Women’s Power and Anthropometric Status in Zimbabwe.” Social Science 
and Medicine 51: 1517–28. 
Hoddinott, J., and L. Haddad. 1995. “Does Female Income Share Influence Household 
Expenditures? Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 57 
(1): 77–96. 
Imai, K.S., S.K. Annim, V.S. Kulkarni, and R. Gaiha. 2014. “Women’s Empowerment and 
Prevalence of Stunted and Underweight Children in Rural India.” World Development 62 
(July 2012). Elsevier Ltd: 888–105.  
Instituto Geofisico del Peru, IGP. 2005. “Diagnóstico de La Cuenca Del Mantaro Bajo La Visión 
Del Cambio Climático Vol II.” 
Isvan, N. 1991. “Productive and Reproductive Decisions in Turkey: The Role of Domestic 
Bargaining.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 53 (4): 1057–70. 
Jejeebhoy, S.J. 2000. “Women’s Autonomy in Rural India: Its Dimensions, Determinants and the 
Influence of Context.” In Women‘s Empowerment and Demographic Processes: Beyond 
Cairo, edited by G Presser and G Sen. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jejeebhoy, S.J., and Z.A. Sathat. 2001. “Women’s Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence 
of Religion and Region.” Population & Development Review 27 (4): 687–712. 
Kabeer, N. 1999. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of 
Women’s Empowerment.” Development and Change 30 (3): 435–64. 
———. 2011. “MDGs, Social Justice and the Challenge of Intersecting Inequalities.” CDPR 
(Centre for Development Policy and Research) Policy Brief No. 3, March. 
Kamal, N., and K.M. Zunaid. 2006. “Education and Women‘s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” 
Working Paper 11, Independent University, Bangladesh: Centre for Health, Population and 
Development (CHPD). 
Kathewera-Banda, M., V. Kamanga-Njikho, G. Malera, G. Mauluka, M. Kamwano Mazinga, and 
S. Ndhlovu. 2011. “Women’s Access to Land and Household Bargaining Power: A 
Comparative Action-Research Project in Patrilineal and Matrilineal Societies in Malawi.” 
Rome. 
Katz, E., and J.S. Chammorro. 2003. “Gender, Land Rights, and the Household Economy in Rural 
84 
 
Nicaragua and Honduras.” In Annual Conference of the Latin American and Caribbean 
Economics Association. Puebla-Mexico. 
Kishor, S. 1995. Autonomy and Egyptian Women: Findings from the 1988 Egypt Demographic 
and Health Survey. Occasional Papers 2. Calverton: Md.: Macro International Inc. 
———. 2000. “Empowerment of Women in Egypt and Links to the Survival and Health of Their 
Infants.” In Women‘s Empowerment and Demographic Processes: Moving Beyond Cairo, 
edited by Harriet Presser and Gita Sen. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kline, R.B. 2011. Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. 3rd ed. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Lawley, D.N. 1943. “On the Problems Connected with Item Selection and Test Construction.” 
Proceedings of the Royal Socierty of Edinburgh 61 (3): 273–87. 
Lokshin, M., and M. Ravallion. 2005. “Self-Rated Power and Welfare in Russia.” In Measuring 
Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Deepa Narayan. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
Lundberg, S., and R.A. Pollak. 1993. “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market.” 
Journal of Political Economy 101 (6): 988–1010. 
Malhotra, A., and M. Mather. 1997. “Do Schooling and Work Empower Women in Developing 
Countries? Gender and Domestic Decisions in Sri Lanka.” Sociological Forum 12 (4): 599–
630. 
Malhotra, A., and S. Schuler. 2005. “Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International 
Development.” In Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by 
Deepa Narayan, 71–88. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Malhotra, A., S. R. Schuler, and C. Boender. 2002. Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a 
Variable in International Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Manser, M., and M. Brown. 1980. “Marriage and Household Decision Making: A Bargaining 
Analysis.” International Economic Review 21 (1): 31–44. 
Martin, A.D., and K.M. Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999.” Political Analysis 10 (2): 134–53. 
Mason, K.O. 1993. “The Impact of Women’s Position on Demographic Change during the Course 
of Development.” In Women’s Position and Demographic Change, edited by Nora Federici, 
Karen Oppenheim Mason, and Sølvi Sogner, 19–42. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1998. “Wives’ Economic Decision-Making Power in the Family: Five Asian Countries.” 
In The Changing Family in Comparative Perspective: Asia and the United States, edited by 
85 
 
Karen Oppenheim Mason, 105–33. Honolulu: East-West Center. 
———. 2005. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: Learning from Cross-National Research.” In 
Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Deepa Narayan, 89–
102. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
McIntosh, C. 2012. “Improving the Evaluation of Model Fit in Confirmatory Factor Analysis: A 
Commentary on Gundy, C.M., Fayers, P.M., Groenvold, M., Petersen, M. Aa., Scott, N.W., 
Sprangers, M.A.J., Velikov, G., Aaronson, N.K. (2011). Comparing Higher-Order Models 
for the EO.” Quality of Life Research 21 (9): 1619–21. 
Meinzen-Dick, R., L.R. Brown, H.S. Feldstein, and A.R. Quisumbing. 1997. “Gender, Property 
Rights, and Natural Resources.” World Development 25 (8): 1303–15. 
Mohapatra, S., and L. Simon. Forthcoming. “Intra-Household Bargaining over Household 
Technology Adoption.” Review of Economics of the Household. 
Momsen, J. H. 1991. Women and Development in the Third World. North Yorkshire: Routledge. 
Montgomery, J.M., and J. Cutler. 2013. “Computerized Adaptive Testing for Public Opinion 
Surveys.” Political Analysis 21 (2): 141–71. 
Nakasone, E. 2011. “The Impact of Land Titling on Labor Allocation Evidence from Rural Peru.” 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), no. 11. 
Narayan, D. 2002. “Empowerment and Poverty Reduction.” Washington, DC : World Bank. 
———. 2005. Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Washington, DC: The 
World Bank. 
Nuijten, M., and D. Lorenzo. 2009. “¡ Dueños de Todo Y de nada!(Owners of All and Nothing).” 
In The Rights and Wrongs of Land Restitution:’Restoring What Was Ours', edited by Jay 
Derick and Deborah James. New York: Routledge-Cavendish. 
Nuijten, M., D. Lorenzo, and P. de Vries. 2006. “Property Relations and the Concept of 
Community in the Central Andes of Peru.” In In Colloquium “Les Frontières de La Question 
Foncière–At the Frontier of Land Issues.” Montpellier, France. 
O’neil, T., P. Domingo, and C. Valters. 2014. “Progress on Women’s Empowerment. From 
Technical Fixes to Political Action.” Development Progress Working Paper. 
Panda, P., and B. Agarwal. 2005. “Marital Violence, Human Development and Women’s Property 
Status in India.” World Development 33 (5): 823–50. 
Parveen, S., and I. Leonhäuser. 2004. “Empowerment of Rural Women in Bangladesh-A 
Household Level Analysis.” In Conference on Rural Poverty Reduction through Research for 
Development and Transformation. 
86 
 
Patel, A., W. Leonard, V. Reyes-García, T. McDade, T. Huanca, S. Tanner, and V. Vadez. 2007. 
“Parental Preference, Bargaining Power, and Child Nutritional Status: Evidence from the 
Bolivian Amazon.” Tsimane’Amazonian Panel Study Working Paper. 
Pitt, M.M., S.R. Khandker, and J. Cartwright. 2006. “Empowering Women with Micro Finance: 
Evidence from Bangladesh.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 54 (4): 791–831. 
PNUD. 2010. “‘Actuar Sobre El Futuro: Romper La Transmisión Intergeneracional de La 
Desigualdad, Informe Regional.” Informe Regional Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América 
Latina Y El Caribe. 
Quisumbing, A.R., and J.A. Maluccio. 2003. “Intrahousehold Allocation and Gender Relations – 
New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 68 (3). 
Ramsar Sites Information Service. 1997. “Reserva Nacional de Junín | Ramsar Sites Information 
Service.” https://rsis.ramsar.org/ris/882. 
Rao, N. 2005. “Questioning Women’s Solidarity: The Case of Land Rights, Santal Parganas, 
Jharkhand, India.” The Journal of Development Studies 41 (3): 353–75. 
Rasch, G. 1960. “Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Achievement Tests.” 
Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for Educational Research. 
Roberts, B., and C. Samaniego. 1978. “The Evolution of Pastoral Villages and the Significance of 
Agrarian Reform in the Highlands of Central Peru.” In Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist 
Expansion in Central Peru. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Ross, K.L., Y.A. Zereyesus, A. Shanoyan, and V. Amanor-boadu. 2015. “The Health Effects of 
Women Empowerment : Recent Evidence from Northern Ghana” 18 (1): 127–44. 
Sabroni, E., A.R. Quisumbing, and A.U. Ahmed. 2013. “The Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI): Results from the 2011-2012 Bangladesh Integrated Household 
Survey.” Project report submitted to the US Agency for International Development. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Dhaka, Bangladesh. http://ebrary. ifpri. 
org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/127504 (2013). 
Samejima, F. 1997. “Graded Response Model.” In Handbook of Modern Item Response Theory. 
Springer Science & Business Media, edited by Wim J. van der Linden and Ronald K. 
Hambleton, 85–100. New York: Springer. 
Samman, E., and M.E. Santos. 2009. “Agency and Empowerment : A Review of Concepts , 
Indicators and Empirical Evidence.” Background Paper for the 2009 Human Development 
Report in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1–48. 
87 
 
Schlager, E., and E. Ostrom. 1992. “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis.” Land Economics 68 (3): 249–62. 
Schuler, S. R., and S. M. Hashemi. 1994. “Credit Programs, Women‟s Empowerment, and 
Contraceptive Use in Rural Bangladesh.” Studies in Family Planning 25 (2): 65–76. 
Schultz, T.P. 2002. “Why Governments Should Invest More to Educate Girls.” World 
Development 30 (2): 212. 
Sen, A. 1989. “Co-Operation, Inequality, and the Family.” In Rural Development and Population: 
Institutions and Policy, edited by G. McNicoll and M. Cain. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 1990. “Gender and Cooperative Conflicts.” In Persistent Inequalities: Women and World 
Development, edited by I Thinker. 
Skrondal, A., and S. Rabe-hesketh. 2007. “Latent Variable Modelling: A Survey.” Scandinavian 
Journal of Statistics 34 (4): 712–45. 
Smith, L., and L. Haddad. 1999. “Explaining Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries.” 
Washington, DC. 
Speizer, I. S., L. Whittle, and M. Carter. 2005. “Gender Relations and Reproductive Decision-
Making in Honduras.” International Family Planning Perspectives 31 (3): 131–39. 
StataCorp. 2013. Stata: Release 13. Statistical Software. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
StataCorp. 2015. Stata: Release 14. Statistical Software. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP 
Tello, J., M. Hermann, and A. Calderon. 1992. “La Maca (Lepidium Meyenii Walp): Cultivo 
Alimenticio Potencial Para Las Zonas Alto Andinas.” In Congreso Internacional Sobre 
Cultivos Andinos, 59–66. La Paz: Boletin de Lima. 
Thurstone, L.L. 1927. “A Law of Comparative Judgement.” Psychological Review 34 (2): 273–
86. 
Treier, S., and S. Jackman. 2008. “Democracy as a Latent Variable.” American Journal of Political 
Science 52 (1): 201–17. 
Trommlerová, S.K., S. Klasen, and O. Leßmann. 2015. “Determinants of Empowerment in a 
Capability-Based Poverty Approach: Evidence from The Gambia.” World Development 66: 
1–15.  
UN. 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
undocs.org/A/RES/70/1. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 1972. “Women: The Neglected Human 
88 
 
Resource for African Development.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue 
Canadienne Des Études Africaines, Special Issue: The Roles of African Women: Past, Present 
and Future 6 (2): 359–70. 
Von Braun, J., and P.J. Webb. 1989. “The Impact of New Crop Technology on the Agricultural 
Division of Labor in a West African Setting.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
37 (3): 513–34. 
Wiig, H. 2011. “Gender Experiments in Peru.” World Bank. 
———. 2013. “Joint Titling in Rural Peru: Impact on Women’s Participation in Household 
Decision-Making.” World Development 52 (196328). Elsevier Ltd: 104–19.  
Wiig, H., R. Bråten, and D.O. Fuentes. 2011. “The Impact of Land on Women’s Empowerment in 
Peruvian Communities.” 
World Bank. 2012. “World Development Report 2012:Gender Equality and Development.” 
Zheng, X., and S. Rabe-Hesketh. 2007. “Estimating Parameters of Dichotomous and Ordinal Item 
Response Models with Gllamm.” Stata Journal 7 (3): 313–33.  
 
 
89 
 
Appendix A 
Section 1. An Exploratory Analysis of the Boom of Maca and Policy Implications of 
Empowerment Thresholds and Sensitivities 
Right now there is an interesting phenomena unfolding in the Lake Junín area driven by 
the boom of maca. This event has both environmental consequences, as well as implications for 
women’s livelihoods. While we don’t have enough data to do an impact assessment study of the 
production of maca, which is also beyond the scope of this work, we will simply consider a 
hypothetical scenario. We will assume that the gender relations and specifically women’s 
empowerment and the intra-household land effects stay the same. After providing a general set 
of conclusion regarding our results, this annex takes a specific approach. We will apply our 
results and draw conclusions and policy-implications from our work in the context of maca 
production. To do so, we first describe the policy issue introducing the boom of maca and its 
potential impacts on women’s livelihoods. Then we draw implications of the influence metrics 
that we estimated in the previous sections for Peru’s economy. 
1.1 The Economic Boom of Maca 
Maca is a perennial herbaceous plant native to the high Andean region of Peru and Bolivia 
that grows in a restricted ecological zone at about 3800 to 4000 meters above sea level (Tello, 
Hermann, and Calderon 1992; Gonzales et al. 2003; Clément et al. 2010). Although maca has been 
consumed by local communities for centuries, recent marketing of maca as the “new superfood” 
and the “new ginseng” has exploded its production in the last few years. As a result, throngs of 
foreign buyers have moved into the Peruvian highlands to be part of this new market opportunity. 
As a result, working in maca cultivation and processing has become a new livelihood activity for 
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local farmers. However, the future livelihoods in the area might be threaten by the rapid expansion 
of maca.   
Although scientific evidence is scant, the production of maca has raised concerns due to its 
environmental impacts. The land use changes from grasslands to maca plantations are especially 
concerning. Since the undisturbed grasslands in the High Peruvian Andes area are thought to be 
rich in carbon (CIP 2010), this land use change could emit significant amounts of greenhouse 
gasses. The rapid expansion of maca is also concerning because it takes land several years to 
recover after maca is harvested. Even though most farmers depend heavily on land for their 
livelihood, the area of land farmers rent out for maca production continues to grow. It is possible 
that the future of women’s main livelihood, grazing livestock, will be threaten as land becomes 
scarcer and more expensive in the area.  
1.2 Consequences of Maca Production on Women’s Livelihoods   
The boom of maca has two main impacts on the communities in our study area. First, there 
is a significant flow of money going into these communities as maca is sold by farmers or as land 
is rented out to foreign producers. Second, the production of maca is driving land use changes at 
rates that are likely going to threaten the future of grazing livestock, the main livelihood of farmers, 
especially women, in the area. The objective of this section is to identify which groups will benefit 
and which groups will bear the costs of the impacts of the expansion of maca. To do so, we will 
try to answer two main questions. First, who is benefitting from producing maca? Second, whose 
livelihoods are likely to be more affected as land becomes scarcer? To do so we will draw from 
observations from our fieldwork as well as data collected for our study. 
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Producing maca is a lucrative but expensive option for farmers. Only those who can afford 
the investment costs and have access to land can become maca producers. As a result, relative to 
foreign buyers, very few local farmers have been able to enter the market. According to our data, 
5 percent of women and 10 percent of men local farmers are producing maca (Table 11). These 
percentages are very low considering the current boom in maca production.  
 
The production of maca has two main constraints (1) investment costs and (2) access to 
land. First, we will try to identify who is more likely to overcome the investment constraints and 
Figure 11. Probability of Producing Maca by Gender as a Function of 
Individual Wealth 
 
Table 11. Percentage of Local Farmers Producing Maca by Gender 
 
Women Men 
Produces Maca 5.91 10
N 186 130
Percentage 
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enter the market of maca. Figure 11 plots the probability of producing maca for men and women 
as wealth increases. The probability of men producing maca is higher for every level of wealth. 
We can also see from the cut-off points that women require a larger amount of wealth to have any 
probability of producing maca. Thus, this graph suggests that in general it is more likely for men 
to enter the market especially as their wealth increases and they can cover the investment costs of 
production. 
Farmers producing or renting out land for maca are giving up any other alternative use of 
the land for several years. It is likely that only farmers with more than enough land to cover their 
grazing livestock needs are the ones that can afford to rent out their land or use their land for maca 
production. In Figure 12 we can see the probability of an individual producing maca as a function 
of total area of land in their households. The graph shows a slight increase in the probability of 
producing maca as the area of land increases. The increasing rate is especially evident in the range 
of 200 to 300 hectares of land. There are only a few observations of households with access to 
more than 300 hectares of land. It is possible that households with access to land outside this range 
are too involved in livestock operations to devote time to the labor intensive nature of maca 
production. During our data collection and fieldwork wealthier farmers seemed to be the most 
concerned about the environmental impacts of maca. Thus, wealthier farmers might be against the 
production of maca either because they are more aware of its environmental impacts or because 
they do not need the new economic opportunity it offers. Either possibility would explain the lack 
of maca producers among the largest landowners. With the exceptions of the largest landowners 
the graph suggests that the probability of producing maca is greater for households with more 
hectares of land. 
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The expansion of maca is threatening livestock activities by competing with available land 
for grazing. Thus, to identify whose livelihoods will be more affected as land becomes scarcer we 
will analyze who is more dependent on grazing livestock. Figure 13 reports time allocation patterns 
between farm, off-farm, and domestic activities of women and men that are single or in 
partnerships. First, we can see that men alone do more farm and off-farm work than women alone. 
This difference could be due to higher work opportunities available for men relative to women or 
to higher responsibilities of women living alone. For instance, a divorced woman is more likely to 
look after her children than a divorced man. When women enter into a partnership with a man, 
however, they do less agriculture and more domestic work. This trade-off is not surprising given 
the expected gender roles of women as caregivers of the household. 
 
Figure 12. Household's Probability of Producing Maca as a Function of 
Total Area of Land 
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While the farm work hours decrease, off-farm work hours surprisingly increase as women 
enter a partnership. In contrast, when men go into a partnership with women they do slightly more 
agriculture, more off-farm work, and less domestic work. This again is consistent with the role of 
women as a caregiver; the man is able to invest more time in work activities as his domestic work 
burden decreases and is taken over by the woman. In conclusion, we see that in both cases men 
have greater opportunities to do off-farm work while women’s opportunities are mediated by men. 
The previous graph describes the time allocation between farm, off-farm and domestic 
activities. In contrast, Figure 14 depicts the proportion of individuals within each group that 
depend solely on farm activities, solely on off-farm activities, or on both. As seen in the figure, 
the majority of women, both alone and in partnerships, rely solely on farm activities. In contrast, 
more than 25% of men alone and in partnerships rely on both farm and off-farm activities. In the 
case of men in partnerships, only about half of the sample relies solely on farm activities. Thus, 
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Figure 13. Time Allocation Patterns between Men and Women in 
Partnerships and Alone 
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we can expect that a greater proportion of women relative to men will face direct impacts as land, 
an essential resource for their livelihoods, becomes scarcer. 
The previous discussion suggests that women are not only facing higher barriers to enter 
the market of maca but will also bear more of the impacts of its production. The descriptive results 
of our data suggest that women are stuck in farm activities and that a large proportion of women 
depend solely on farming. Thus, if the expansion of maca creates so much pressure on land 
resources affecting the productivity of grazing livestock it is possible that women will struggle to 
transition into other occupations in the future. This scenario would be more optimistic if women 
could use maca profits and invest them into productive assets. However, we also provide evidence 
that women might face higher barriers to enter the market of maca. Even if women are able to 
Figure 14. Proportion of Men and Women Relying on Farm Only, Off-farm Only, 
and Both Farm and Off-farm Activities 
 
Men Alone Women Alone
Men in Couple Women in Couple
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overcome the investment costs of production, say by accessing credit, they are likely going to face 
an additional constraint of land.   
1.3  Policy Application of Empowerment Thresholds and Sensitivities  
In light of the implications of maca production as described above, policy interventions 
might be needed to protect women’s livelihoods and achieve environmental goals. If policymakers 
were interested in using empowerment as a tool to protect women’s wellbeing, then the results 
from our structural model could be used to identify the most effective way of increasing 
empowerment (e.g., by increasing joint land rights vs increasing women’s education). The results 
from our measurement model could allow them to align the changes in influences resulting from 
an increase of empowerment with their policy objectives. For instance, let’s assume that there are 
two policy outcome alternatives: (A) increasing women’s participation in maca production so 
women can then invest and transition into other livelihood activities (B) reducing the land use 
changes driven by the expansion of maca to protect the future of women’s grazing livestock 
operations. Let’s assume that the probability of achieving each policy outcome is a function of 
specific influences. For example, increasing women’s participation in maca production would 
require women’s participation in decisions over credit and commercial crops. Since the land use 
changes are driven by renting land out or cultivating maca, policy B would be a function of the 
influences regarding whether or not to rent out land or buy commercial crops. Our policy 
alternatives could be therefore expressed as: 
𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠, 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐) 
𝐵 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐, 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠) 
Policymakers would therefore need to assess the feasibility of both options to make an 
informed decision. According to our estimated parameters, influence over bank credit has the 
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highest threshold and the lowest sensitivity. Influences over commercial crops decisions (over 
buying/selling and income decisions) also have high thresholds (but lower than influence over 
bank credit) but are also highly sensitive. Policy B, on the other hand, is a function of influence 
over renting out land instead of influence over bank credit. Although influences over renting out 
land are also not ideal for policymakers (since they have relatively high thresholds), they are still 
more sensitive and have lower thresholds than the influence over bank credit. Based on this 
information only, policy makers would prefer policy B over policy A. 
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Appendix B: Household Survey 
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Appendix C: Individual Survey and WEAI 
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